Between 2015 and 2050, Africa’s youth will almost double, from 230 to 452 million. The fastest growing African economies have not created enough jobs for youth. By 2050, half of Africa’s population will be below 25 years old. In 2016, the average age of African presidents is 66, while the average median age of the continent’s population is 20. Of the 25 fastest growing economies in the world between 2004 and 2014, ten are African. Nearly 30 million young Africans were unemployed in 2015. In 2015, four African countries featured in the global top ten for the highest terrorism levels: Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt, Libya. Between one-third and a half of the tertiary educated populations of Kenya, Uganda, Liberia, Mozambique and Ghana leave their country. A majority of African citizens trust religious leaders, the army and their traditional leaders more than their elected representatives. Over a decade, the number of terrorist attacks on the African continent has increased by more 1,000%. On average, almost half of the African population is currently still below the legal voting age. For more than a quarter of Africa’s population the leader has not changed for the last ten years, and often much longer. Somalia, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda have still not ratified the 2004 Protocol to the 1999 AU Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism. 56 African Heads of State have left office over the last decade, including nine that died in office and 13 stepping down following a coup, an arrest or an uprising. Less than a quarter of Africa’s youth is “very interested in public affairs”. Over a decade the number of protests and riots have increased more than tenfold.
Introduction

The Ibrahim Forum, held annually since 2010, focuses on the challenges of critical importance to Africa, for which wise leadership and sound governance are essential.

Bringing together a diverse range of high-level African stakeholders from the public and private arenas as well as influential partners based outside the continent, the Forum prides itself on promoting open and frank discussion. It aims to go beyond the familiar analysis of problems and restatement of commitments to encourage fresh, pragmatic solutions and shared responsibilities.

To help achieve these ambitions, the Foundation produces a Forum Report ahead of each annual event. This compiles facts and figures using the most relevant and recent data and insights around the topics for discussion.

The focus of the 2017 Forum is “Africa at a tipping point” and what needs to be done to ensure that Africa’s progress continues to rise rather than fall back. The result of this defining moment depends more than anything else on our ability to harness the energy, and meet the expectations, of Africa’s young people.

60% of the continent’s population are under 25 years of age. In 2050, Africa will be home to 452 million people between the ages of 15 and 24. Their drive, ambition and potential provide African countries with an extraordinary asset.

But today, too many of them feel devoid of economic prospects and robbed of any say on the future of their own continent.

The commodity cycle of the past decade may have supercharged many African GDPs but it created almost no jobs. Young people may have spent more years in school but too few have been equipped with the skills the economy needs. The more educated they are, the less likely they are to find employment on their own continent.

The nature and fit of democracy is also being tested. “Free and fair” elections have indeed multiplied over the last decade, leading to peaceful changes of power. But voter turnout is declining and scepticism about elected representatives growing. An average gap of 46 years between the people and their rulers fuels doubt about whether those elected to office can relate to the interests of their citizens. Meanwhile, alternative political models such as China, and the rise of populism and parochialism in Western countries, which some believe will lead to better economic futures, weaken the appeal of current democratic models.

The lack of economic opportunity mixed with democratic fatigue and political disenfranchisement may become a “toxic brew”. The 1000% increase in terrorist attacks in Africa over a decade and the rising number of those risking their lives to cross the Mediterranean show where frustration, anger and despair can lead. Climate change, created elsewhere but impacting Africa the most, will only intensify these problems.

Terrorism’s growing footprint on the continent is fuelling conflict, division and instability and damaging prosperity by acting as a parasite on economies. It has become a well-organised multi-billion dollar criminal enterprise with growing control over the drugs trade, people trafficking and other parts of the black market. The jobs, status and income that terrorism offers to young people who are cut off from the mainstream economy, may be more attractive than the ideology itself.

High hopes can also lead to deep frustrations. If the energy and ambition of Africa’s youth continue to be wasted, they could become serious destabilising forces, threatening not just future progress but rolling back the gains of recent years. This huge and immediate challenge requires committed leadership and robust governance if Africa is to enable its young people to build the prosperous and peaceful future we all want to see.
# What Prospects for Africa’s Youth?

**AFRICA’S COMPELLING DYNAMICS: A YOUNG CONTINENT, GROWING FAST**
- Back on the growth path
- The youngest continent
- The youth bulge: dividend or threat?

**SPOTLIGHT | URBAN YOUTH**

**AFRICA’S GROWTH: STILL MAINLY JOBLESS**
- Growth over the last decade: mainly export-led
- Youth unemployment remains high
- Agriculture: the New Frontier?

**SPOTLIGHT | AN ETHIOPIAN SUCCESS STORY: AGRICULTURE**

**AFRICA’S YOUTH: THE SKILLS MISMATCH**
- Better educated & less employed
- Employment in Africa: higher education is not an asset
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**MIGRATIONS: PUSH & PULL FACTORS**
- The hope of jobs elsewhere: pulling economic migrants
- Pushed to escape: refugees & displaced persons

**CLIMATE CHANGE DISRUPTIONS**
- Timeline of initiatives
- Multiple & cumulative risks
- Towards a continental response

**SPOTLIGHT | CLEAN ENERGY: THE POTENTIAL TO LEAPFROG**

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**SPOTLIGHT | “TERRORISM”: NO COMMON DEFINITION, NO COMMON LIST**

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- Spreading & intensifying
- Multiple targets: victims & methods
- Identification: a complex task
- The “spaghetti bowl”: subsidiaries, splinters, mergers

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- Illicit trade & donations: diversified funding
- Drugs: a global chain
- Smuggling migrants: exploiting people
- Kidnapping: lucrative ransoms
- Moving funds: many vehicles

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- The regional policies: under-resourced
- The UN policy: a unified response?

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SPOTLIGHT | CLEAN ENERGY: THE POTENTIAL TO LEAPFROG

End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.
Ensure inclusive and quality education for all and promote lifelong learning.
Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.
Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all.
Build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation.
Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.
Revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development.
**What Prospects for Africa’s Youth?**

**AFRICA’S COMPELLING DYNAMICS: A YOUNG CONTINENT, A FAST GROWTH**

**Back on the growth path**

**African population & real GDP growth rate, Africa**

- Africa’s real GDP grew at 2.1% in 2016. After a significant decline between 2012 and 2016, this growth is projected to reach 4.5% by 2021.
- While Asia and the Pacific and Central America experienced higher economic growth than Africa in 2016 (5.2% and 3.9%, respectively), Africa is predicted to be the second fastest growing region again in 2019 with a 4.4% real GDP growth rate. Only Asia and the Pacific will grow faster (at a 5.4% rate).
- However, at an estimated $2,948 billion in 2021, the entirety of Africa’s GDP will still only be slightly larger than three quarters of India’s GDP and around 16% of China’s.
African countries among the world’s best performers

- Many African countries now rank among the world’s best performers for economic growth:
  - Of the 25 fastest growing economies in the world between 2004 and 2014, ten were African.
  - Of the top 20 countries with the highest services growth between 2006 and 2014, eight were African.
  - Of the top 20 countries with the highest growth in industrial output between 2006 and 2014, nine were African.

At an estimated $505 billion in 2021, the continent’s biggest economy, Nigeria, should still amount to around half of Turkey’s GDP and 36% of Indonesia’s.
Africa’s population is currently 1.2 billion and is expected to more than double by 2050. By which time:

- More than half of the 2.4 billion people projected to join the global population will be African.
- A quarter of the world’s population will be African.

Africa is already the world’s youngest continent:

- In 2015, the youth (between 15 and 24 years of age), amounted to almost one fifth of the 1.2 billion population in Africa.
- By 2050, half the continent’s population will be below 25 years old.
- Between 2015 and 2050, Africa’s youth will almost double, growing from 230 to 452 million.
- By the end of the century, nearly half of the world’s youth (47%) will be African. Africa’s youth – with 632 million people – will be bigger than Asia’s and nearly ten times bigger than Europe’s.

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**AFRICA’S COMPELLING DYNAMICS: A YOUNG CONTINENT, A FAST GROWTH**

The youngest continent

Africa’s youth map

- UNDESA
Distribution of global youth population, main world regions

Actual & projected youth population (millions)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2050</th>
<th>2100</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>632</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>669</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>521</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America &amp; the Caribbean</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MIF based on (2): UNDESA
The youth bulge: dividend or threat?

Africa’s youth bulge:

- Constitutes a source of both labour inputs and human capital in production, improving total factor productivity in a region of the world where capital formation is limited.
- Constitutes a reliable source of demand for a country’s economy through their consumption activity. Simply lowering the youth unemployment rate to that of adults would lead to a 10-20% increase in Africa’s GDP.
- Is fundamental for the development of a new class of African entrepreneurs.
- Means that Africa has the opportunity to reap a “demographic dividend”: As the total dependency ratio is projected to decrease steadily until 2085 (55.7%, compared to 82.6% in 2005), there will be a larger workforce supporting fewer children and elderly people. The lower dependency burden will free up resources for development.

However, failure to harness this dividend could be a threat. The consequences of not taking full advantage of the youth’s potential are wide-ranging, including significant economic losses, armed conflict, brain-drain, as well as political and social unrest and instability.

Out-of-school primary school-age children, both sexes

There were nearly 9 million of out-of-school primary school-age children in Nigeria in 2010. This exclusion paves the way to future dissatisfaction, frustration and the search for alternative prospects.

Total dependency ratio, Africa

SPOTLIGHT | URBAN YOUTH

- In the next 35 years, Africa’s urban population is expected to almost triple, from 472 million to 1.3 billion.
- Youth unemployment rates are generally higher in urban than rural areas in Africa.
- When urban growth does not go hand in hand with structural transformation, fast-growing African cities fail at providing their youth with jobs.
- Gambia, Libya and South Africa, who already have more than half of their population living in urban areas, also have some of the highest levels of youth unemployment (>40%).
AFRICA’S GROWTH: STILL MAINLY JOBLESS

Growth over the last decade: mainly export-led

- The commodity super-cycle has been the major driver of real GDP growth in Africa over the last decade.
- As such, the end of the commodity boom, along with declining demand from abroad, especially from China, have driven down the continent’s GDP (from 6.4% in 2012 to 2.1% in 2016).
- In particular, oil prices have decreased significantly. The price of a barrel of oil decreased from 105$/barrel in 2012 to 43$/barrel in 2016.

- Africa’s oil exporters have been severely affected by such a plunge in prices. For instance, Equatorial Guinea saw its economy shrink by 9.9% in 2016.
- While the price of copper per metric tonne decreased from $8,828 in 2011 to $4,868 in 2016, the nominal GDP of Zambia, a copper exporter, decreased by more than 7 billion US$ during the three years preceding 2016.

Oil price, Diversification, Revenue Mobilisation & Sustainable Economic Opportunity

- [Graph showing oil price, diversification, revenue mobilisation, and sustainable economic opportunity indicators for the period 2006-2016.]
- [Graph showing copper prices and Zambia's nominal GDP for the period 2006-2016.]
- [Graph showing real GDP growth for African oil exporters for the period 2006-2016.]
Youth unemployment remains high

- The strong economic growth of the last decade has not created jobs for youth.
- Looking at 51 countries during the period 2006-2016, there is no correlation, even weak, between economic growth and youth unemployment.
- Countries can display very similar youth unemployment rates and have markedly different GDP growth. For instance, in 2016 the youth unemployment rate in both Sudan and Kenya is 22%, even though Kenya’s GDP growth is 6.0%, nearly double Sudan’s rate of 3.1%.
• Over the last ten years, while Africa’s real GDP has grown at an annual average of 4.5%, youth unemployment levels have remained quite stable.

• In Côte d’Ivoire and Djibouti (some of the fastest growing African economies with a real GDP growth of 6.5% or higher in 2016), economic growth has not been accompanied by a substantial reduction in youth unemployment rates.

• In the case of Djibouti, youth unemployment has even increased (from 11.5% in 2006 to 11.8% in 2016).

• Non mineral resource-rich countries have managed high economic growth alongside lower levels of unemployment, especially economies that rely more on agriculture such as Ethiopia and Tanzania.

• During 2006-2015, Ethiopia’s nominal GDP increased by 303.3%, and Tanzania grew by more than 100%.

• At the same time, already relatively low youth unemployment levels kept decreasing in Tanzania (from 5.7% to 4.9%) and remained relatively stable in Ethiopia (from 7.4% to 8.1%).
Although Ethiopia’s share of urban population is growing fast, due to high population growth, the absolute number of people living in rural areas is increasing significantly as well.

• From 2000 to 2050 the rural population living in Ethiopia will have doubled (from 56.3 million to 117.1 million).

• Although its economic growth has reduced in recent years, the country performs better than most African countries in terms of economic growth and job creation.

• General unemployment and youth unemployment rates have remained relatively stable since 2006.

• While the continent’s general unemployment and youth unemployment rates were 8% and 13% in 2016, these figures were significantly lower in the case of Ethiopia (5.7% and 8.1%, respectively).

In Ethiopia, agriculture is the largest sector of the economy, providing jobs for 80% of the workforce and accounting for more than 40% of the country’s GDP.

• Recognising the importance of the agricultural sector for employment creation and poverty reduction within its large rural population, the Ethiopian government launched several strategies, namely the strategy for an ‘Agricultural Development-Led Industrialization’, the ‘Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme’ (SDPRP), and the ‘Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty (PASDEP).

• Ethiopia’s public budget prioritises the growth-oriented pro-poor sectors of education, agriculture and food security, water and sanitation, health and roads. In 2012/2013, the public sector investment in those areas accounted for over 70% of general government spending.
AFRICA’S YOUTH: THE SKILLS MISMATCH

Better educated & less employed

Youth unemployment levels

• In 2015, 29.5 million young Africans were unemployed.
• African youth face unemployment rates that are twice those of adults.
• Despite being the second largest African economy, South Africa is not able to provide jobs for more than half of its youth population.
• More than a third of the youth in Egypt and almost half in Libya are unemployed (33.4% and 48.1%, respectively).
• Between one-quarter and one-third of the youth are unemployed in Algeria and Tunisia (26.6% and 35.7%, respectively) and one fifth in Morocco (20.6%).

AFDB, ILO, MIF based on: ILO; UNDESA
AFRICA’S YOUTH: THE SKILLS MISMATCH

Employment in Africa: higher education is not an asset

Employment by level of education

% of total employed population

- In most African countries for which there are data available in the last ten years (16 countries), the majority of people employed only have a basic level of education.
- Algeria, Mauritius and South Africa have the highest rates of employed people with an advanced education (23.0%, 22.1% and 20.3%, respectively).

The more educated, the less employed?

- There is a slightly positive correlation between levels of youth unemployment and the gross enrolment ratio in tertiary education programmes during the period 2006-2016.
- Despite having some of the most educated populations (with gross enrolment ratios in tertiary education over 30%), Egypt and Tunisia also have some of the highest youth unemployment rates on the continent, greater than 30%.
In Djibouti, Algeria, Mauritania, Ghana, Benin, Madagascar and Sudan, there is a much higher percentage of tertiary graduates in fields of study such as arts and humanities, than in others such as engineering, manufacturing and construction.

The countries that have a higher percentage of graduates in engineering, manufacturing and construction are Tunisia, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mauritius, Gambia, Ethiopia and Burundi.

Less than 5% of graduates have specialised in information and communication technologies in Mauritania, Sudan, South Africa, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Algeria, Benin, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Lesotho and Mozambique, whose youth populations collectively account for around one third of African 15-24 year-olds.

Both the AU Agenda 2063 and the African Common Position on the Post-2015 development agenda underline that science, technology and innovation are key pillars for Africa’s development.
AFRICA’S YOUTH: THE SKILLS MISMATCH

Comparative disadvantage with Latin America & Asia

Tertiary graduates by field of study, Latin America & the Caribbean

- In the majority of countries for which data are available in Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia, engineering, manufacturing and construction are the most popular fields of study among tertiary education students.
- Iran has the highest percentage of tertiary education graduates in the fields of engineering, manufacturing and construction (32.4%).
- Only Argentina, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, Brunei, Lebanon and Laos have more tertiary education graduates in the fields of arts and humanities.
- Vietnam, Mexico and Malaysia have high percentages of tertiary graduates in the fields of engineering, manufacturing and construction (21.4%, 23.0% and 26.7%, respectively) and relatively low youth unemployment rates (6.7%, 9.4% and 11.3%, respectively).

Tertiary graduates by field of study, Asia

UNESCO; ILO
The emerging Moroccan aerospace industry shows the possibilities for youth job creation and benefits of tailoring education to industry requirements.

Tertiary education graduates in Morocco have graduated from a broader set of fields of study than most African countries. This provided a foundation for an emerging aerospace industry near Casablanca.

In 1997 the Moroccan Seddik Belyamini, then Boeing’s Executive President for Worldwide Sales in Seattle, led an internal search within Boeing to identify what aerospace components might be reliably produced in Casablanca. The study led to the creation of a joint venture – Matis – between Boeing, Royal Air Maroc, and the Moroccan firm Labinal to outsource assembly of wire harnesses to Morocco. Though initially expecting around 30% productivity growth, Matis achieved 70% within two years and now builds wire bundles for the Boeing 737, 747, 757, 767 and 777. Airbus, SNECMA, Bombardier, and Embraer have set up export facilities in the same industrial parks.

Morocco’s revealed comparative advantage in airplane parts

The total value of Morocco’s exports of aircraft parts rocketed from $3.8m in 2002 to $369.6m in 2015. According to the Balassa Index, Morocco’s comparative advantage in airplane parts has likewise increased.

This diversification of exports is part of a structural transformation in the economy which has stimulated changes in education and foreign direct investment (FDI) promotion. In 2009 Morocco renovated its Agency in Charge of Promoting FDI and also established an Institute for Aeronautical Training as a collaboration between the Organization of Moroccan Aeronautics Companies (Groupement des Industriels Marocain Aeronautique et Spatial or GIMAS), the Union of Metallurgical Workers and the Ministries of Labour, Industry. GIMAS plays a central role in the design of the curriculum, with continuous course renovation to meet the needs of current and potential employers.
MIGRATIONS: PUSH & PULL FACTORS

The hope of jobs elsewhere: pulling economic migrants

Tertiary-educated people have the highest migration rates. More than half of the tertiary-educated population in Cape Verde (67%), Gambia (63%), Mauritius (56%), Seychelles (56%) and Sierra Leone (52%) and between a third and a half of the tertiary-educated population in Ghana (50%), Mozambique (45%), Liberia (45%), Kenya (38%) and Uganda (35%) leave their country.

Highly-skilled labour emigration, % of highly-skilled native labour force

Highly-skilled immigration, % of highly-skilled labour force
Pushed to escape: refugees & displaced persons

Persons of concern (2006-2015)

![Graph showing trends in persons of concern from different African countries over 2006-2015.]

- On average Africa has accounted for a third (33%) of the global “persons of concern” over the past decade, reaching a high in 2011 of 38%.
- The clear majority of these remain in Africa. The percentage of African persons of concern being hosted in Africa has not dropped below 93% between 2006-2015.
- In comparison, an average of only 3% of African persons of concern are hosted in Europe. This is just over half a million people, and 1% of the global total persons of concern.

Africa as host

- In 2015, South Sudan featured as a source of refugees in four of the five African countries which host the greatest number of refugees.
- In the first six months of 2016, four African countries were in the global top ten countries hosting the greatest numbers of refugees: Ethiopia (5th), Kenya (7th), Uganda (8th) and Chad (10th).
Migration within countries – internally displaced people

- Refugees and asylum seekers allow a perspective on migration outside of a country’s borders. However, in most cases the volume of “internally displaced people” (IDPs) within a country will be larger than refugees and asylum seekers.
- Together these elements form the major parts of the “population of concern”. The population of concern originating from South Sudan stood at 2.8 million people in mid-2016.
- The five countries producing the greatest populations of concern in Africa in 2016 are Sudan, South Sudan, Nigeria, DRC and Somalia.

- In three of these five countries around three quarters of these populations of concern are formed by internally displaced people within the country: Sudan (82%), Nigeria (78%) and DRC (72%).
- In the preceding decade (2006-2015), Nigeria’s population of concern has increased by 2.3 million people.
- This is an increase of 10964% since 2006. This is the third highest increase over the decade. Libya and Niger are greater in percentage terms – with 19808% and 16024% respectively.

African countries producing the most persons of concern in 2016 (first six months)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sudan</th>
<th>South Sudan</th>
<th>Nigeria</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>Somalia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Refugees and people in refugee-like situations</td>
<td>638,986</td>
<td>854,172</td>
<td>181,294</td>
<td>536,074</td>
<td>6,074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers</td>
<td>45,678</td>
<td>4,408</td>
<td>57,897</td>
<td>78,090</td>
<td>78,090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internally Displaced People (including people in IDP-like situations)</td>
<td>3,218,234</td>
<td>905,000</td>
<td>2,087,336</td>
<td>1,722,082</td>
<td>1,722,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned IDPs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1,061,226</td>
<td>331,152</td>
<td>43,000</td>
<td>43,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned refugees</td>
<td>32,526</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17,293</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others of concern</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8,796</td>
<td>8,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total persons of concern</td>
<td>3,935,436</td>
<td>2,824,824</td>
<td>2,674,992</td>
<td>2,388,061</td>
<td>2,388,061</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Lake Chad basin crisis

- Although the IDPs in Nigeria decreased slightly by 4% in the first 6 months of 2016, the effects of the security crisis in the Lake Chad basin can be seen in the surrounding countries, especially Cameroon and Chad where the IDPs increased by 106% and 42% respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population in 2016</th>
<th>Internally displaced people as a percentage of the population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>11,079,013</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAR</td>
<td>4,998,493</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>41,175,541</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>12,733,427</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>6,330,159</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

UNDESA and 2016 MYSR
Timeline of initiatives

2009
In Africa, climate change issues are addressed at the highest political level through the Committee of African Heads of States and Governments on Climate Change (CAHOSCC) established by the African Union. In this context, CAHOSCC adopted in 2014 the high-level framework “Work Programme on Climate Change Action in Africa” (WPCAA) that covers five priority areas including: i) Climate financing and addressing technology needs; ii) Africa-wide programme on Adaptation; iii) Actions on Mitigation; iv) Cross-cutting actions and participation.

2010
The Climate for Development in Africa Programme (ClimDev-Africa) is a joint initiative implemented by the African Development Bank, the African Union Commission and UNECA. The overarching goal of the ClimDev-Africa Programme is to seek ways of overcoming the lack of necessary climate information, analysis and options required by policy and decision-makers at all levels.

2010
The African Group of Negotiators (AGN) consists of climate change negotiators of every African country, chaired by one country selected for a period of two years. AGN gets its direction from the African Ministers of Environment (AMCEN), the CAHOSCC and the African Union Assembly.

2012
The West African Science Service Centre on Climate Change and Adapted Land Use (WASCAL) is a large-scale research-focused Climate Service Centre designed to help tackle this challenge and thereby enhance the resilience of human and environmental systems to climate change and increased variability. It does so by strengthening the research infrastructure and capacity in West Africa related to climate change and by pooling the expertise of ten West African countries and Germany.

2012
The African Risk Capacity (ARC) was established as a Specialized Agency of the African Union to help Member States improve their capacities to better plan, prepare and respond to extreme weather events and natural disasters and to ensure food security. The ARC uses the Africa RiskView, an advanced satellite-weather surveillance and software to estimate and trigger readily available funds to African countries hit by severe weather events.

2015
The Africa Renewable Energy Initiative (AREI) commits to accelerating access to renewable energy in Africa and developing countries in other regions with a view to reducing energy poverty and mobilising substantial financial resources from private investors, development finance institutions and multilateral development banks by 2020.

2015
Launched at COP21 in Paris, the Africa Climate Change Initiative aims at providing support to African countries to enhance adaptation action and address loss and damage on the continent.

2016
The Southern African Regional Universities Association Programme for Climate Change Capacity Development (PCCGD) is a Consortium of seven universities from five SADC countries which have developed a regional Master’s curriculum in Climate Change and Sustainable Development.
CLIMATE CHANGE DISRUPTIONS

Multiple & cumulative risks

- Africa is expected to be one of the continents hardest hit by climate change. It is expected to warm around 1.5 times faster than the global average.
- Multiple climate extremes such as drought, rising sea levels and flooding will become more frequent.
- The economic cost of these impacts is estimated to be about $45-50 billion per year by 2040, and up to 7% of Africa’s GDP on average by 2100.

Sea level rises

- Projections of global sea level rise by 2100 range from 0.2 metres to 2.0 metres. Rising sea levels create higher risks of flooding, erosion, storm surges and intense rainstorms.
- More than 25% of Africa’s population live within 100 km of the coastal zone and the continent has close to 320 coastal cities.
- In Nigeria, about 20 million people, almost a quarter of the national population, live along the coastal zone.
- In Senegal, about 4.5 million people, two thirds of the national population, live in the Dakar coastal area. About 90% of the industries in Senegal are located within the Dakar coastal zone.

African land at risk of flooding

KEY
- Projected increased extreme precipitation
- Flood risk hotspot (hazard+high vulnerability)
- Extreme flood hazard
- Significant flood hazard
- 10 largest urban agglomerations (population)
- African cities at risk of sea level rise

BBC; UNECA
IPS; IPCC; GCI; The Guardian

01_What Prospects for Africa’s Youth?
Droughts, water stress and famine

- Global warming of 2°C would put over 50% of the continent’s population at risk of undernourishment.
- Between 1.5°C-2°C warming, drought and aridity will contribute to farmers losing 40-80% of cropland conducive to growing maize, millet, and sorghum by the 2030s-2040s.
- By 2020, between 75 and 250 million people in Africa are projected to be exposed to increased water stress due to climate change.

IPS, IPCC, GCL, The Guardian

Drought & desertification

Current drought in Eastern Africa
In Ethiopia, 5.6 million people are in urgent need of food and 9.2 million people are expected not have a regular supply of safe drinking water.

In Somalia, the number of people in need of emergency food aid has doubled in the last six months to 6.2 million. Over 360,000 acutely malnourished children are in urgent need of support.

Oxfam

African land at risk of drought

KEY
- Projected increased dry periods
- Drought risk hotspot (hazard+high vulnerability)
- Extreme drought hazard
- Significant drought hazard
- 10 largest urban agglomerations (population)
Climate change and human security: migrations and conflicts

The number of floods, droughts and storms has devastating effects on vulnerable communities. In 2008, 20 million people were displaced by extreme weather events, compared to 4.6 million internally displaced by conflict and violence over the same period. By 2050, it is estimated that about 200 million environment migrants will be moving internally or externally. Global warming may also lead to armed conflicts. The six-year-old conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region is an example where environmental pressures morphed into war, and the drylands of East Africa and the Middle East are also vulnerable to added stresses from global warming.

The United Nations climate change conferences: towards COP 23

- The Paris Agreement negotiated at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP 21), aims to keep the global average temperature increase to well below 1.5°C, foster climate resilience and ensure finance flows for climate-resilient development. The agreement has been signed by all 54 African countries and already ratified by 35.
- Assuming international efforts keep global warming below 2°C, Africa could face climate change adaptation costs of US$ 50 billion per year by 2050.
- Africa, currently the most exposed region to climate change, has only been able to access less than 4% of global climate financing due to a lack of bankable projects on the continent.
- At COP22 in Marrakech in November 2016, developed nations committed to mobilise the finance goal of $100 billion for developing countries.

Climate financing issues in Africa

- Ensuring full implementation of existing finance;
- Avoid shifting of responsibility towards the private sector or to developing countries under the new agreement;
- The need for a clear pathway for finance between now and 2020 (the end of the Kyoto Protocol);
- Capitalisation of the Green Climate Fund and easing access to the funds;
- Ensuring finance to enable the preparation of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions by developing countries.

SPOTLIGHT | CLEAN ENERGY: THE POTENTIAL TO LEAPFROG

Africa has an opportunity to “leapfrog” to modern, energy efficient technologies, since the continent has a rich portfolio of clean energy assets, including about 1,100 gigawatts of solar capacity, more than enough to meet total energy demand.

Modern renewable technology options (hydropower, wind energy, concentrating solar power, geothermal sources, solar photovoltaics) account for 5% of Africa’s total final energy consumption. This could be increased to 22% in 2030.

- Kenya’s Rift Valley region has a potential of producing 10,000 megawatts of geothermal energy, with the country tapping only 10% of it.
- Noor 1, Morocco’s solar power plant at the town of Ouazzazate, which now provides 160 megawatts (MW) of the ultimate 580MW capacity, helping the country to save hundreds of thousands of tonnes of carbon emissions per year.

The transformation to clean energy would require on average US $70 billion per year of investment between 2015 and 2030. Within that total, about US $45 billion would be for generation capacity and about US $25 billion would be for transmission and distribution infrastructure.
Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge

SPOTLIGHT | “TERRORISM”: NO COMMON DEFINITION, NO COMMON LIST

GROWTH OVER A DECADE (2006-2015)
- Spreading & intensifying
- Multiple targets: victims & methods
- Identification: a complex task
- The “spaghetti bowl”: subsidiaries, splinters, mergers

GLOBAL TERRORIST “BUSINESS MODELS”
- Requirements & resources: structures in place
- Illicit trade & donations: diversified funding
- Drugs: a global chain
- Smuggling migrants: exploiting people
- Kidnapping: lucrative ransoms
- Moving funds: many vehicles

FIGHTING TERRORISM: PARALLEL APPROACHES
- The continental policy: slow moving
- The regional policies: under-resourced
- The UN policy: a unified response?

GOVERNANCE SHORTFALLS: KEY TRIGGERS
- Terrorist “hubs” & weak governance
- Failing democratic participation
- Social exclusion & poverty
- High levels of corruption
- Rising domestic conflicts

End poverty in all its forms everywhere.
Reduce inequality within and among countries.
Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies.
Revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development.
Terrorism originated as a linguistic, political term with various connotations, depending on whether it was being used by a perpetrator or a victim. “Terror” comes from the Latin terrere, which means “frighten” or “tremble”.

**1790s**
The term “terrorism” originated during the French Revolution (1793-1794). It was used initially in a positive sense by a group of rebels (the Jacobins) as a self-reflexive portrayal of their own actions, and explanations of, the French Revolution. The French politician Robespierre said at the time that “terror is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible”. However, once the radical faction turned against its leader it accused him of terrorism, lending a negative connotation to the word.

**1798s**
The word “terrorism” was first recorded in English-language dictionaries in 1798 as meaning “systematic use of terror as a policy”.

**1930s**
An international attempt to define terrorism was started by the League of Nations following the assassination of King Alexander I of Yugoslavia in Marseille in 1934. A League of Nations Convention on the prevention and punishment of terrorism was signed in 1937 (but never entered into force), defining terrorism as “criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or a group of persons or the general public”.

**1960s and 1970s**
The definition of terrorism became more complex with the emergence of new nationalists and ethnic separatist groups. In 1972, the UN General Assembly established the Ad Hoc Committee on International Terrorism after the attack on Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. The UN attempted to agree on a definition for terrorism but it was not until 1979 that the Ad Hoc Committee adopted a resolution laying out the general approach towards international terrorism.

**UN difficulties with defining terrorism**
The UN General Assembly has made repeated attempts to define terrorism, without success due to three main issues:

1. One person’s freedom fighter is another person’s terrorist. People under foreign occupation have the right to resist and defining terrorism is complicated by this.

In 1987-8, the African National Congress party in South Africa (ANC) was labelled by the UK and US governments as “terrorist”.

2. Is the reliance on terror the main factor to distinguish a movement from its political opponents?

3. Even if certain terrorist methods are employed by a movement, is “terrorist” an accurate description of the movement as a whole?

**UNITED NATIONS (UN) - DRAFT COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION AGAINST INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (NOT APPROVED) (1996)**
Any person committing, attempting to commit, making a credible and serious threat to commit, or participating or organising the following offenses:

a. Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
b. Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or to the environment; or
c. Damage to property, places, facilities or systems referred to in paragraph 1 (b) of the present article resulting or likely to result in major economic loss; when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from doing any act.
EUROPEAN UNION COUNCIL (EU) FRAMEWORK DECISION 2002/475/JHA OF 13 JUNE 2002 ON COMBATING TERRORISM

a. Attacks upon a person’s life which may cause death;
b. Attacks upon the physical integrity of a person;
c. Kidnapping or hostage taking;
d. Causing extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
e. Seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
f. Manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons, explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as research into, and development, of biological and chemical weapons;
g. Release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the effect of which is to endanger human life;
h. Interfering with or disrupting the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the effect of which is to endanger human life;
i. Threatening to commit any of the acts listed in (a) to (h).

“Terrorist” movements: no common list

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UN</th>
<th>EU</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>UAE</th>
<th>New Zealand</th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Canada</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Shabaab</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Armed Islamic Group (GIA)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar al Sharia</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansaru</td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUJAO</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Muslim Brotherhood is defined as a “terrorist organisation” by Bahrain, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and UAE.

ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY (OAU) CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION AND COMBATING OF TERRORISM (1999)

Any act which "may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:

- intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles;
- disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency;
- create general insurrection in a State."

ORGANIZATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE (OIC) CONVENTION ON COMBATING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM (1999)

Any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorising people or threatening to harm them or imperilling their lives, honour, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States.

THE ARAB CONVENTION ON THE SUPPRESSION OF TERRORISM (1998)

“Any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs for the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda, causing terror among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing their lives, liberty or security in danger, or aiming to cause damage to the environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupy or to seize them, or aiming to jeopardise a national resource.”
02_Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge

GROWTH OVER A DECADE (2006-2015)

Spreading & intensifying

• Since 2006, terrorist attacks on the continent have increased by over 1,000%, with a sharp rise between 2013 and 2014.

Total number of terrorist events

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of terrorism events</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>393</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>1,648</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3,093</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

• Between 2013 and 2014 the number of terrorist events on the continent almost doubled.
• 75% of the total number of terrorist events between 2013 and 2014 occurred in Libya, Nigeria and Somalia.

Terrorist attacks: concentration & intensity

Intensity value is a combination of incident fatalities and injuries
The most comprehensive and accurate available data on terrorism are issued from the GTD from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), based at the University of Maryland. The GTD defines terrorism as follows:

A terrorist attack is the “threatened or use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation”. In practice this means that to consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following criteria must be present:

- The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
- The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence – including property violence, as well as violence against people.
- The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.

Nigeria: 17,930
Somalia: 6,278
DRC: 2,577
Sudan: 2,393
Cameroon: 1,766
Libya: 1,652
Egypt: 1,463
South Sudan: 1,420
Algeria: 1,240
CAR: 1,182
Kenya: 1,119
Niger: 807
Chad: 723
Main attack types in Africa

- Ordinary citizens remain the biggest victims of terrorist attacks and are increasingly targeted, with 35.8% of all attacks in 2015 targeting civilians and their property.
- Attacks on private citizens and property soared from 71 in 2006 to 1,107 in 2015.
- Attacks on military and government targets have increased, with the percentage of attacks on foreign governments more than doubling.

Tactics remain largely focused on armed assault and bombings, indicating a preference for mass civilian casualties.
Identification: a complex task

According to the GTD, these groups have carried out the most "terrorist attacks" or caused the most fatalities, 2006-2015*.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Attacks</th>
<th>Deaths caused</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GIA Armed Islamic Group</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>DRC, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam Brigade</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>786</td>
<td>Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Shabaab</td>
<td>2127</td>
<td>5804</td>
<td>Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Tanzania, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar al-Sharia (Libya)</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Ansar Jerusalem)</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Balaka Militia</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>Cameroon, Central African Republic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barqa Province of the Islamic State</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boko Haram</td>
<td>1,839</td>
<td>17,093</td>
<td>Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Yau Yau Militia</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democratic Front for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Fulani Militants</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>1,908</td>
<td>Central African Republic, Mali, Nigeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haftar Militia</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Janjaweed</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>Chad, Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>Chad, Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1,259</td>
<td>Central African Republic, DRC, South Sudan, Sudan, Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for Unity and jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>Algeria, Mali, Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea, Nigeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim Fundamentalists</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>205</td>
<td>Algeria, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Egypt, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Africa, Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>Ethiopia, Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting (GSPC)</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seleka</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td>Cameroon, Central African Republic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sinai Province of the Islamic State</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>623</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement - North</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>513</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Movement in Opposition (SPLM-IO)</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>861</td>
<td>South Sudan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tripoli Province of the Islamic State</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>Libya, Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of Forces for Democracy and Development (UFDD)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>Chad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To consider an incident for inclusion in the GTD, all three of the following criteria must be present:

- The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
- The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence – including property violence, as well as violence against people.
- The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.

* Groups that have caused 100 or more fatalities or attacks.
The “spaghetti bowl”: subsidiaries, splinters, mergers

- One of the difficulties in identifying and classifying terrorist groups is their constant evolution, through splinter groups, mergers and subsidiaries. This has sometimes been referred to as a “spaghetti bowl”.

Constant dynamic: some examples

**GIA (Armed Islamic Group)**

- Created in Algeria in 1992, following the military coup and the internment of thousands of officials of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS).
- Aims: overthrow the Algerian government “to purge the land of the ungodly” and “create an atmosphere of general and constant insecurity”.
- Motto: “no agreement, no truce, no dialogue”.
- Now largely defunct, Algerian and Western counter-terrorism officials say that many members may have defected in recent years and joined Al-Qaeda or its sister organisation Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

**GSPC (Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat)**

- Created in 1998 during the Algerian civil war as an offshoot of the GIA.
- Declared its loyalty to Al-Qaeda and transformed into AQIM in 2007.

**Al-Shabaab**

- Came to the fore in Somalia in 2006 as the militia of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), taking control of Mogadishu.
- Joined Al-Qaeda in 2012.
- Suspected links with AQIM and Boko Haram.

**Ansar al-Sharia**

- Appeared after the Tunisian revolution in 2011.
- Aim: implementation of strict Sharia law.
- Maintains close ties with Al-Qaeda, AQIM, Ansar al-Sharia in Libya and Islamic state of Iraq and Levant (ISIL).

**AQIM (Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb)**

- Created in 2007 (from GIA and GSPC).
- Aims: ridding North Africa of Western influence; overthrowing governments deemed apostate, including those of Algeria, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia; installing fundamentalist regimes based on Sharia; and attacking Western targets.

**Al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam Brigade**

- Former AQIM leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar quits to form his own group in 2012, to “help consolidate Sharia law in Mali”.

**MUJAO (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa)**

- Created in 2011, as a splinter of AQIM.
Boko Haram (Islamic State West Africa Province since 2015)

Created in 2002 in northeast Nigeria.
Aims: implementation of strict Sharia law and creation of an Islamic state.
Pledged allegiance to ISIL in 2015.
Suspected links with AQIM, Al-Shabaab, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.

Ansaru (Al Qaeda in the Lands Beyond the Sahel)

Created in 2012 in northeast Nigeria, as a splinter group of Boko Haram.
Linked to AQIM.

Al-Mourabitoun

Al-Mua’qi’oon Biddam Brigade & MUJAO merge to form Al-Mourabitoun in 2013.

ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, "IS", "ISIS", "Daech") and known African subsidiaries

ISIL-SP (ISIL-Sinai province), formed in 2014, initially known as Ansar Beit al-Maqdis.
ISIL-L (ISIL-Libya), active since 2014, initially with three "provinces": Cyrenaica (Barqa), Tripolitania, Fezzan.
GLOBAL TERRORIST "BUSINESS MODELS"

Requirements & resources: structures in place

- Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram are the two deadliest terrorist groups in Africa, having caused an estimated 5,804 and 17,093 deaths respectively over a decade (2006-2015). They are also the two richest terrorist groups on the continent and feature in the top ten richest groups in the world.

- Terrorist groups are becoming more professional and include financial management practices such as documenting revenue levels and sources, expenditure reporting and accounting.

Top ten richest terrorist organisations globally (2014) | Annual turnover, $ million
--- | ---
1. ISIS | 2,000
2. Hamas | 1,000
3. FARC | 600
4. Hezbollah | 500
5. Taliban | 400
6. Al-Qaeda | 150
7. Lashkar-e-Taiba | 100
8. Al-Shabaab | 70
9. Real IRA | 50
10. Boko Haram | 25

Operational expenditure includes purchase of weapons, travel to and from target locations, use of vehicles and other machinery, and facilities to plan the operations.

Over the decade 41.9% of the attacks on the continent were carried out with explosives or bombs and 40.6% were carried out with firearms, not including expensive weaponry.

Terrorist organisations require funding for human resources, including recruitment, training (weapons training, bomb-making, clandestine communication and ideology) and facilities.

Salaries are distributed not only for members but also for the families of the jailed or deceased. The distribution of salaries is an important recruitment motivation, as such groups draw their members mainly from disaffected youth, the unemployed, and more and more high school or university graduates.

To undermine the credibility of legitimate governments and to build support within local populations, many terrorist groups establish or subsidise and finance social institutions that provide health, social and educational services.

Propaganda is a key part of recruitment and fundraising. It can involve the use of internet and social media, but also more expensive platforms such as radio and television outlets.

- Benefiting from porous land and maritime borders, fragile rule of law and high corruption levels, the illegal smuggling of goods and people is an extremely important source of revenue for terrorist groups.

- Terrorist organisations in Africa rely on numerous sources of income. Donations funnelled through private individuals, "Politically Exposed Persons" (PEPs) and charities are large sources of funding.

- The illicit markets that affect Africa frequently originate or terminate on other continents. Purely local interventions are inadequate to resolve the underlying problem.
Illicit trade & donations: diversified funding

Donations

- Funding through Islamic donations (e.g. Zakat\(^1\)) continues to be one of the methods used by designated terrorist groups operating in West and Central Africa. This method requires little infrastructure and is profitable because it manipulates a common practice of the Muslim population in the area.

- The use of these donations to support violent extremism is often unknown to the donating population. Regional authorities are unable to control or monitor these movements of money, which commonly comprise small amounts of cash.

- Supporters of extremist groups also knowingly and wilfully finance the activities of the organisation with donations. For example, Niger has observed the collection of cash contributions from traders or businessmen who are sympathisers or members of terrorist groups.

- Voluntary contributions also come from supporters abroad. For instance, AQIM receives donations from supporters in Europe.

Illicit smuggling of tobacco, natural resources & wildlife

- Illicit tobacco, natural resources (coal, gas, timber and oil) and wildlife trade are primary sources of revenue for terrorist groups in Africa.

- The total value of illegal tobacco trade in north Africa is thought to exceed $1 billion and is believed to have provided the bulk of financing for AQIM.

- It is estimated that terrorist groups may gain $111-289 million annually from illicit taxing of charcoal, which appears to be one of Al-Shabaab’s primary income sources (estimated annual total of $38–56 million).

- Groups such as Niger Delta militants may be linked with oil theft in Nigeria. In 2013, 100,000 barrels per day were estimated to be stolen from facilities by organised crime groups, which at 2013 prices represented above $11 million per day\(^2\). There is a high risk that the proceeds of such operations go to extremist groups such as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta.

- The annual income from ivory to militias in the entire sub-Saharan region is estimated to be in the order of $4.0–12.2 million. Groups such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Janjaweed primarily benefit from wildlife smuggling.

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\(^1\)The compulsory giving of a set proportion of one’s wealth to charity.

\(^2\)This value was calculated obtaining the average crude oil price in 2013 from the Central Bank of Nigeria.
02_Violent Extremism: the Scale of the Challenge

GLOBAL TERRORIST “BUSINESS MODELS”

Drugs: a global chain

• Drug trafficking, coming through both West and East Africa, is a major source of funding for terrorist groups: at least 50 tonnes of cocaine are transiting West Africa every year. The volume of heroin confiscated in West and East Africa was 674kg in 2012.

• Drugs, namely cocaine and heroin, are smuggled from West and East Africa to Europe, the US and Asia through mules, shipments or overland across the Sahara.

• Terrorist groups in Africa are either directly involved in drug trafficking, as AQIM is, or prosper by offering protection to smugglers who guard the traditional long-distance trading routes northward to the Mediterranean, as Boko Haram does.

Napoleoni, L.; Rotberg, R.; UNODC 2015, 2017

MIF based on: UNEP, UNODC 2015(2)
The Kofi Annan Foundation took the lead in setting up the WACD. The Commission includes 11 regional leaders from the political world, civil society, the health sector, security and law enforcement, and the judiciary. It is chaired by Olusegun Obasanjo, former President of Nigeria, and includes Pedro Pires, former President of Cabo Verde and Ibrahim Laureate.

In 2014, the WACD launched the report “Not Just in Transit: Drugs, the State and Society in West Africa”. Its main conclusions and recommendations are the following.

**Conclusions**

- West Africa is no longer only a transit zone for drugs. Drugs are having a profound and disturbing effect on the stability of countries in the region and their development prospects;
- West Africa is ill prepared for this assault on its societies. Institutions of governance and justice are still quite fragile and vulnerable to penetration by organised crime and drug money;
- Illicit drugs are an international problem that cannot be solved by West Africa alone;
- Health systems in the region do not have the means or capacity to offer adequate prevention, treatment or harm reduction services to drug users.

**Recommendations**

- Treat drug use as a public health issue, rather than as a criminal justice matter;
- Confront openly the political and governance weaknesses, which traffickers exploit;
- Reform drug laws on the basis of existing and emerging minimum health standards and pursue decriminalisation of drug use and low-level, non-violent drug offences;
- Strengthen law enforcement for more selective deterrence, focusing on high-level targets;
- Avoid the militarisation of drug policy and related counter-trafficking measures of the kind that some countries have applied at great cost without reducing drug supply;
- Intensify cooperation between producing, transit and consuming countries not only on interdiction but also on prevention, treatment and harm reduction.
Smuggling migrants: exploiting people

- Revenue from human smuggling is increasingly used to finance terrorist activity. This is particularly true for groups such as AQIM, who have some territorial control of the Sahel.
- Some 55,000 migrants are thought to be smuggled from East, North and West Africa into Europe every year, generating around $150 million in revenue for criminals.
- Smugglers typically charge each migrant between $800 and $1,000 to reach Libya, and then between $1,500 and $1,900 to cross the Mediterranean to Europe.
- In 2015, over 220 smugglers were identified by Europol as being involved in more than one crime. 22% of the suspected migrant smugglers were linked to drug trafficking, 20% to trafficking in human beings and 20% to property crime.
- The smuggling market becomes more lucrative when the activity is illegal and risks are high. Within West Africa, the freedom of movement granted by ECOWAS gives less incentive to smuggling of migrants.
- Major hubs for migrant smuggling typically register low or around average scores in the sub-category Rule of Law and for the indicator Corruption in Government & Public Officials in the 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG). Where improvements in trends in these measures are observed, these are small.
- Smuggling is dependent on corruption. Corrupt public officials, such as border and port authorities, soldiers, immigration officials, embassy and consulate employees are paid to ignore or to facilitate the process.

Europol and INTERPOL, Napoleonii, L, TIME, UNODC 2011, 2017

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**Rule of Law (2016 IIAG)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hubs for migrant smuggling</th>
<th>Score/100</th>
<th>Change since 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>-22.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>54.2</td>
<td>+3.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Corruption in Government & Public Officials (2016 IIAG)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hubs for migrant smuggling</th>
<th>Score/100</th>
<th>Change since 2006</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>-5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>No change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>+5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Kidnapping: lucrative ransoms

- Kidnapping for ransom (KFR) is a growing primary source of revenue for terrorist groups, including Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram and AQIM, and paid ransoms are reported to range from $630,000 to $8.4 million per ransom.

- In the last decade, kidnapping events on the continent grew by more than 1,000%, with an increase of more than 330% from 2013 to 2014. In parallel, the number of ransoms demanded has increased by more than 130% in the past decade, with a spike of 275% from 2013 to 2014.

  ![Graph showing percentage increase/decrease in KFR, Africa](START)

  - Orange line: % increase in attacks where ransoms are demanded
  - Red line: % increase in attacks where victims are kidnapped/taken hostage

  **Number of incidents where victims were kidnapped or taken hostage**

  ![Graph showing share of kidnappings per group, 2006-2015](START)

  - Nigeria
  - Libya
  - Somalia
  - Sudan
  - DRC

- Nigeria, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and the DRC are the top five countries on the continent for the number of incidents where groups kidnapped or took hostages.

- The groups that have most frequently used kidnapping and hostage taking as a tactic over the last decade are the LRA, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Janjaweed, the Tripoli Province of the Islamic State, AQIM and the Fulani Militants.
Moving funds: many vehicles

- Accurate data on Illicit Financial Flows (IFF) are limited, however IFFs from Africa could be as much as $50 billion per annum. This is approximately double the official development assistance (ODA) that Africa receives.
- IFFs can be moved in smuggled cash, through intermediaries such as Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs), trade, Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) or via transfer systems.
- Cash, including foreign currency and Money Value Transfer Systems (MVTS), are the most common means of transfer.

Smuggling cash

- Weak security at porous national borders, ports and checkpoints are exploited by terrorist groups to smuggle cash and small arms. This is exacerbated by a lack of domestic inter-agency co-ordination and collaboration, cross border co-operation, and the existence of informal and unregulated economies.
- The existence of trafficking routes, such as AQIM’s in West Africa, is also benefitting the smuggling of cash.
- Lack of effective currency declaration systems at borders, the prevalence of informal and unregulated economies, and the predominance of cash transactions in regions like West Africa are also contributing to the situation.
- Terrorist organisations are also exploiting Islamic tenets that forbid men from having any physical contact with women they are not married to, by using women as cash and weapon couriers in Islam-dominated areas.

Transferring cash through the banking sector

- Because of its size and scope, the international banking sector is vulnerable to terrorist groups that blend in with normal financial activity, often through small-scale transactions.
- More complex methods have used accounts of both legitimate and shell businesses with an international presence.
- To overcome anti-money laundering (AML) regulations, traditional products can be abused. For example, sympathisers of a terrorist group open savings accounts and provide the debit card associated with the account to a member of the terrorist organisation to enable them to access cash via withdrawals from overseas bank ATMs.
- This has been observed in cases involving PEPs and charity/NGOs. In some instances, terrorists use proxy accounts to transfer funds to their members. Most often, these funds are withdrawn using ATMs.

Using money value transfer systems (MVTS)

- The remittance sector has been exploited by terrorist groups, especially in conflict-prone countries where access to banking services is limited.
- Migrant communities and families rely heavily on MVTS to remit funds home. This not only provides a channel for mixing terrorist financing with legitimate transfers, it also makes it difficult to distinguish terrorist activity from normal family and community transfers.
- This is compounded by agents or employees who facilitate transfers on behalf of terrorist groups, including the faking of transaction reporting to confuse or anonymise details.

Non-Profit Organisations (NPOs)

- Compromised NGOs/charities use the cover of humanitarian work to avoid detection by serving as a conduit for moving funds to terrorists and/or terrorist organisations under the guise of legitimate and charitable operations.
- NGOs and charities are particularly vulnerable to terrorist financing because of their potential role as conduits for moving funds to the various locations in which they operate, including conflict zones and areas where there are low levels of governance. NPOs may also have exposure to many beneficiaries, some of whom may be vulnerable to radicalisation.

Laundering money

- Terrorist organisations use innovative ways to make use of legitimate trade transactions, both small and large scale, to launder money and to collect and transfer funds.

Innovative methods

- Terrorist groups are continually finding new and innovative ways to move money to finance terrorist activities.
- New avenues of moving money that pose large risks include digital currency such as bitcoin. The Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has already warned against the possibility of exploitation of digital currency by criminals and terrorists on the continent. With transactions “largely untraceable and anonymous”, CBN claims virtual currency transactions are “susceptible to abuse by criminals, especially in money laundering and financing of terrorism”.

Quartz Africa
Case studies

Cash couriers & arms smugglers in Burkina Faso & Nigeria

Two individuals from Niger were apprehended at the Burkina-Niger border while on their way to Nigeria. Both were in possession of weapons, ammunition (about 80,000 cartridges), and almost $13,000. These persons were charged with trafficking in weapons and ammunition. They disclosed that they had ties to Boko Haram. This case involved a private arms dealer in Burkina Faso who allegedly provided these without the approval of the authorities.

Complicit agent in Somalia

An individual raised funds for Al-Shabaab from the Somali diaspora in the USA and used a variety of licensed money service businesses (MSBs) with offices in the United States to remit the money to Somalia for general support of Al-Shabaab fighters. The co-conspirator, who worked for one of the MSBs involved, helped the individual avoid detection by structuring transactions into low dollar amounts and by using false identification information. The MSB worker and other conspirators used fictitious names and phone numbers to hide the nature of their transactions.

Abuse of NGO/charity sector in Nigeria

ZT, an international NGO/charity organisation headquartered in the Middle East, sought to open an account in “Bank A” in Nigeria. While carrying out due diligence on ZT, Bank A discovered that the organisation and one of its directors had been indicted in a case involving terrorist financing in two countries. A Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) was immediately filed with the Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU). Subsequent investigations established that ZT had operated in Nigeria for an extended period and had maintained multiple bank accounts in three different Nigerian banks. ZT was also affiliated with another NGO known to have supported terrorist groups, including Al Qaeda. Finally, it was established that ZT’s charity operations supported Hamas, a Palestinian extremist organisation, and Gama’a al-Islamiyya, an Algerian terrorist group. The frequency of withdrawals from ZT accounts in the states known for Boko Haram activities also raised concerns about the ultimate use of these funds. The promoters of ZT claimed to be paying the salaries of itinerant Islamic clerics in Nigeria.

Real estate fictitious companies in Senegal

“Mr M” is a Canadian citizen of Somali origin residing in Dakar. He established a real estate company, Company A in conjunction with “Mr D”, a Senegalese citizen. An account was opened for Company A, at a bank in Senegal. Shortly afterwards, this account received a wire transfer of approximately $106,000 from “Mr S”, a Somali citizen based in the United States. A financial institution based in Dubai executed the transfer. Based on the suspicious circumstances of the transaction, including the country of origin of funds, lack of adequate information documenting the identity of the new customer, and the destination of the funds, Senegalese Bank APLHA filed a Suspicious Transaction Report (STR) to the Senegalese FIU. “Mr M”, “Mr D”, and “Mr S” were in contact with extremist groups involved in terrorist activities in East Africa, North America, Europe, and Mauritania. “Mr M”, “Mr D” and “Mr S” had also established a related company, Company B, together with other Senegalese nationals, to import used goods, some of which were sold locally and the remainder exported to a third country for resale. The proceeds of these sales were sent to a number of terrorist groups.
FIGHTING TERRORISM: PARALLEL APPROACHES

The continental policy: slow moving

1992
Dakar, Senegal
Resolution on the Strengthening of Cooperation and Coordination among African States
During its 28th Ordinary Session, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted this resolution pledging to fight the phenomena of extremism and terrorism.

1994
Tunis, Tunisia
Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations
At its 30th Ordinary Session the OAU adopted this declaration, being the first time that African leaders explicitly described terrorism as a criminal act.

1999
Algiers, Algeria
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism
Adopted by the 35th Ordinary Session of the OAU Summit and entered into force in 2002, this Convention for the first time defined what constituted a terrorist attack. It criminalised terrorist acts under state’s laws, defined areas of cooperation among states, and provided a legal framework for extradition as well as extra-territorial investigations and mutual legal assistance.

2001
Dakar, Senegal
Dakar Declaration Against Terrorism
Shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, this declaration was adopted by 27 Heads of States (Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Chad, Comoros, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo, Tunisia and Uganda). The protocol recognised the growing threat of terrorism and appealed to all African countries to ratify the 1999 Convention, to avoid that the “September 11, 2001 events and their consequences have an adverse impact on the development of Africa”.

In 2016, Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia and Uganda have still not ratified the 2004 Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention & Combating of Terrorism.
The AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism

To give concrete expression to the commitments and obligations of Member States under the 1999 Convention, the AU High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism in Africa adopted the AU Plan of Action. The Plan of Action adopted practical counter-terrorism measures to fight the phenomena of extremism and terrorism.

2004

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism

This protocol mandated the AU’s Peace and Security Council to monitor and facilitate implementation of the 1999 Convention, and encouraged RECs to take a more active role.

2010

Kampala, Uganda

Prevention and Combating of Terrorism

The AU Peace & Security Council highlighted the need for renewed efforts and increased mobilisation against terrorism, and called for Member States that had not done so to urgently sign and ratify the 1999 Convention and its Protocol.

2011

Malabo, Equatorial Guinea

The African Model Anti-Terrorism Law

The Model Law was developed to assist Member States in implementing the provisions contained in the various continental and international counter-terrorism instruments.

2002

Algiers, Algeria

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2004

Algiers, Algeria

The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT)

This centre was established to play an important role in guiding the AU’s counter-terrorism efforts in collaboration with a number of regional and international partners to ensure coherent and coordinated counter-terrorism efforts on the continent.

2010

Kampala, Uganda

Prevention and Combating of Terrorism

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The African Model Anti-Terrorism Law

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The regional policies: under-resourced

**ECOWAS**

**Action:** In 2013, ECOWAS put in place the Political Declaration on a Common Position Against Terrorism, which included a Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Implementation Plan, adopted by the Authority of Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS at its 42nd ordinary session in Yamoussoukro, Côte d’Ivoire.

**Goal:** The principal purpose of the Declaration and Strategy is to prevent and eradicate terrorism and related criminal acts in West Africa, with a view to creating conditions conducive to sound economic development and ensuring the wellbeing of all ECOWAS citizens.

**Strategy:** Inspired by the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, the strategy rests on three main pillars: prevent, pursue and reconstruct.

**Features:** ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit; an ECOWAS Arrest Warrant; and an ECOWAS Black List of Terrorist and Criminal Networks.

**Countries that have not ratified the 2004 Protocol**

- The 2004 Protocol to the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, only entered into force ten years later in 2014 despite only requiring 15 states to ratify it.
- Key state actors in the fight against terrorism in Africa – including Kenya, Nigeria, Somalia and Uganda – have yet to ratify it, and the last country that did (Mauritania), did so in 2014.

**Lack of funding**

- Apart from the legal instruments necessary to address terrorism, an international and continental response against terrorism requires financial cooperation. In 2014, at AU Head of State level Peace and Security Council (PSC) in Nairobi, Kenya highlighted the need for the AU Commission to establish a Counter Terrorism Fund.
- The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) established in 2004 to move efforts on the continent to address terrorism, remains chronically under-funded and under-staffed.

**IGAD**

**Action:** IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) was launched in 2011 after the IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism (ICPAT), absorbing the best practices from the four years of ICPAT while at the same time addressing regional security matters.

**Goal:** To enhance and enable member states’ security sector capacity to address common transnational security threats, thus engendering sustainable economic development; and contribute the prediction, anticipation, prevention, and management of emerging, evolving, and existing security threats in the IGAD region for sustainable development and economic integration.

**Strategy:** The ISSP’s Counter Terrorism (CT) Pillar main goals and activities are geared towards building national and regional capacity of the Horn of Africa countries in the fight against terrorism, radicalisation and extremist violence. The ISSP works in partnership with regional and international organisations such as African Union (AU), Global Counter Terrorism Forum (GCTF), Global Center for Cooperative Security (GCCS), Saharan Research and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) among others.

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In 2014 and 2015, experts from the African Centre for Studies and Research on Terrorism (CAERT), United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT), SADC Organ Early Warnings Unit and from the 15 SADC Member States attended workshops to assess the threat of terrorism and violent extremism to the SADC region, prepared a draft regional counter terrorism strategy and developed a plan to implement it.

**Action:** A Peace and Security Strategy was adopted in November 2006. Subsequently, the EAC adopted the Protocol on Peace and Security as well as the EAC Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism in 2012 at the EAC joint meeting of the sectoral councils on Cooperation in Defence, Inter-state Security and Foreign Policy Coordination.

**Goal:** The Protocol identified over 20 objectives for fostering regional peace and security, these include; combating terrorism and piracy; peace support operations; prevention of genocide; disaster management and crisis response; management of refugees; control of proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and combating transnational and cross-border crimes.

**Strategy:** According to the agreement, member states have agreed on enhancing military, security, and intelligence strategies to combat terrorism, and limit the activities of extremist groups. For example, Egyptian military forces are permitted to participate in border protection with Libya and Sudan, as well as to share military intelligence concerning militant activities. Egypt is also allowed to communicate with countries combating extremist groups, such as Boko Haram in Nigeria, in order to limit, and eventually halt, their activities. The final joint statement of the CEN-SAD countries entailed that a counter-terrorism centre will be established with its permanent headquarters in Egypt.
The UN policy: a unified response?

History
The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy on 8 September 2006. All Member States have agreed for the first time to a common strategic and operational approach to fight terrorism, not only sending a clear message that terrorism is unacceptable in all its forms and manifestations but also resolving to take practical steps individually and collectively to prevent and combat it.

Structure
The General Assembly reviews the Strategy every two years, making it a living document attuned to Member States’ counter-terrorism priorities. The Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, in the form of a resolution and an annexed Plan of Action (A/RES/60/288), is composed of four pillars:

**UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy**

**Pillar I**
Addressing the Conditions Conducive to the Spread of Terrorism.

**Pillar II**
Preventing and Combating Terrorism.

**Pillar III**
Building State capacity and strengthening the role of the United Nations.

**Pillar IV**
Ensuring human rights and the rule of law.

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**International Crisis Group (ICG) analysis & recommendations**

Military means alone will not root out underlying causes of violent extremism. In the Sahel, for example, armed jihadist groups have developed a dangerous new strategy after being chased out of most major towns in the vast expanse of arid, sparsely populated brushland that crosses the continent along the southern edge of the Sahara desert.

Rather than trying to hold towns or urban districts, these groups – which include Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, the Macina Liberation Front (FLM) and Al-Murabitoun – are using bases in the countryside to strike at provincial and district centres, often forcing national armies to retreat and local state authorities to abandon immense rural areas to jihadist control.

Furthermore, increased international support has had the side effect of reinforcing Sahelian countries’ tendency to focus on the political centre whilst jihadists are establishing themselves among rural communities.

Rather than being satisfied with retaking control of towns, Sahelian governments and their partners must reflect on how best to respond to the new strategies used by the jihadists to establish themselves in rural areas and extend their influence. Governments must invest in neglected rural zones and communities that feel marginalised.

Jihadists and other violent non-state groups are filling the security vacuum as the army retreats and local authorities and the central government abandon immense rural areas.

In addition, the rise of a new group, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and the possible influx from Libya of defeated Islamic State (IS) fighters are further sources of concern. Chronic resource limitations hobble Sahelian states’ ability to respond effectively: Niger’s state revenue, for example, is $1.8 billion, about as much as France invested in stadiums to host the UEFA Euro 2016 football championship.
GOVERNANCE SHORTFALLS: KEY TRIGGERS

Terrorist “hubs” & weak governance

- The top ten worst performing African countries in the 2016 Global Terrorism Index (GTI)\(^1\) are Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt, Libya, Cameroon, Niger, DRC, Sudan, Kenya and CAR, scoring below the continental average for Overall Governance in the 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), except Egypt (+1.0 point above the average), Niger (0.2 points above the average) and Kenya (8.9 points above the average).

- Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt and Libya are also in the GTI top ten countries registering the highest levels of terrorism in the world.

- Libya registers the highest increase in terrorism incidence on the continent (+6.937) since 2011, the first data year of the GTI. Libya also shows the largest deterioration in Overall Governance in the IIAG (-10.2) in the same period.

- According to the 2016 GTI, East Africa registered the highest average level of terrorism in 2015, mainly due to high terrorism scores in Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Central Africa registers the highest average increase in terrorism since 2011, mainly due to increases in Cameroon (+4.375) and Chad (+2.82).

- For the 50 African countries where there is a trend available, over half (26) show an increase in terrorism levels between 2011-2015. The number of African countries in the global top ten for highest terrorism levels has also doubled from two in 2011 (Somalia, Nigeria), to four in 2015 (Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt and Libya).

\(^1\)The Global Terrorism Index scores countries from 0 to 10 (higher is worse) and accounts for the direct and indirect impact of terrorism in terms of total number of incidents, total number of fatalities, total number of injuries, sum of property damages and the psychological effects of terrorism.

\(^2\)Cabo Verde, Comoros, São Tomé & Príncipe and Seychelles are not included in the GTI. South Sudan and Togo were only included in 2013, thus the trend in terrorism levels is measured from 2013 to 2015.

\(^3\)Terrorism incidence levels in 2015

\(^4\)Terrorism incidence trends, 2011-2015

\(\text{IEP} 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016, \text{MIF}\)

---

### 2016 GTI & 2016 IIAG scores & ranks, top ten African countries with highest terrorism levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>African Average</th>
<th>2016 GTI (score/10 - higher is worse)</th>
<th>2016 GTI (global rank/130 - higher is worse)</th>
<th>2016 IIAG Overall Governance (score/100 - higher is better)</th>
<th>2016 IIAG (Africa rank/54 - higher is better)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.83724</td>
<td>2.83724</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>50.0</td>
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<td>20</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

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\(\text{IEP} 2011, 2014, 2015, 2016, \text{MIF}\)
**Failing democratic participation**

- Countries on the previous page perform below the African average in several indicators from the 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Top Ten Countries</th>
<th>Average Score</th>
<th>Continental Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transfers of Power</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>39.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Participation</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>52.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Society Participation</td>
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<td>53.8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Free &amp; Fair Elections</td>
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<tr>
<td>Freedom of Expression</td>
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<td>Freedom of Association &amp; Assembly</td>
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<td>Civil Liberties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Rights Violations</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 59% of terror attacks worldwide in 2014 occurred in countries classified by Freedom House as “Not Free”, more than in “Free” and “Partly Free” countries combined.

- For the ten African countries with the highest terrorism levels in the GTI, their average scores for democracy-related indicators in the 2016 IIAG are below the continental average scores for Transfers of Power, Political Participation, Civil Society Participation, Free & Fair Elections, Legitimacy of Political Process, Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Association & Assembly, Civil Liberties and Human Rights Violations.

- Somalia (54th out of 54), Sudan (51st), Libya (50th) and Egypt (46th) are amongst the ten worst performers in the IIAG’s Participation & Human Rights category in 2015. They are also ranked as the 2nd, 8th, 4th and 3rd highest African countries in the GTI in terms of terrorism levels in 2015, respectively.

- Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt and Libya, the four countries with highest levels of terrorism on the continent in the GTI, all register a score of 0.0 in the IIAG Human Rights Violations indicator in 2015.

---

1. Freedom House awards scores to a country’s political rights and civil liberties to determine a rating of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of freedom. Those whose ratings average 1.0 to 2.5 are considered Free, 3.0 to 5.0 Partly Free, and 5.5 to 7.0 Not Free.
2. Nigeria, Somalia, Egypt, Libya, Cameroon, Niger, DRC, Sudan, Kenya and CAR.
Social exclusion & poverty

- Terrorism is highest in countries that perform poorest in measures of social exclusion and have lack of social safety nets.

- The average score of the ten countries with the highest terrorism levels on the continent in the 2016 GTI is below the continental average score in the indicator Social Exclusion in the 2016 IIAG. While the continental average is a low 20.8 out of 100.0, the average score for these countries is 14.3.

- The average score of the ten countries with the highest terrorism levels on the continent in the 2016 GTI is below the continental average score in the indicator Social Safety Nets in the 2016 IIAG. While the continental average is 43.5 out of 100.0, the average score for these countries is 27.7.

The assumed link between terrorism & poverty?

The correlation between the 2016 GTI and the 2016 IIAG Poverty indicator is weak (0.2), suggesting that there is no significant relationship between poverty and terrorism. Additionally, the average of the top ten countries with the highest terrorism levels on the continent is 3.0 points higher than the continental average for the Poverty indicator.

2016 IIAG indicator scores, top ten African countries with the highest terrorism levels & continental average

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Average Score of Top Ten Countries</th>
<th>Continental Average</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Exclusion</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>20.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social Safety Nets</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>43.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
High levels of corruption

- Corruption facilitates terrorism:
  - Corrupt public officials facilitate the collection and movement of funds by terrorist groups.
  - State institutions weakened by corruption are less effective in fighting terrorism.
  - Extremist groups draw on deep public anger at the abuse of power to radicalise and recruit.
- The average scores of the ten African countries with the highest terrorism levels in the GTI register below the continental average scores in the IIAG indicators Corruption in Government & Public Officials and Corruption & Bureaucracy.
- While the African average in Transparency International’s 2016 Corruption Perceptions Index is 31.0 out of 100, the ten African countries with the highest terrorism levels in the 2016 GTI average 22.8.

In Nigeria, Boko Haram’s anti-corruption rhetoric played a major role in the group’s construction in its early years. Corruption also hollowed out the military and left troops ill-equipped and without the incentive to tackle Boko Haram effectively.

Rising domestic conflicts

Correlation between Domestic Armed Conflict & the Global Terrorism Index

- There is a strong negative correlation (-0.8) between the 2016 GTI scores and the 2016 IIAG indicator Domestic Armed Conflict. As a high score in the GTI is worse and a high score in the IIAG is better, this negative correlation suggests that the more countries plunge into internal armed conflict, the higher terrorism levels are.
- The ten African countries with the highest terrorism levels on the continent average 17.5 out of 100.0 in the 2016 IIAG indicator Domestic Armed Conflict, 38.5 points below the African average (56.0).
Global terrorism is a complex phenomenon with multiple factors contributing to its occurrence. Among the factors identified, policies targeting religious freedoms and group grievances are more prone to terrorism. The ten worst performing countries in the 2016 GTI, on average, score below the continental average in the 2016 IIAG indicators: Political Services, Political Violence, Social Unrest and Safety of the Person.

The political violence indicator in the IIAG measures state violence. The correlation between the 2016 GTI and the 2016 IIAG indicator Political Violence are strongly negative in 2013 (-0.8), 2014 (-0.7) and 2015 (-0.6). These negative correlations suggest that where there is a high level of violence committed against civilians by the state, there are also high levels of terrorism.
African Democracy: Citizen Ownership

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Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.

Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies.

Revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development.
“Demos” = people, neighbourhood
“Kratia” = power, force

In the Athenian democracy (4th and 5th century BCE) all male citizens over 18 years old (land-owners and non-slaves) had equal political rights, freedom of speech and the opportunity to participate directly in the political arena in this city-state. Citizens actively served in the institutions that governed them, and directly controlled all parts of the political process.

These concepts remain central to the various academic and institutional definitions of democracy.

- The UN’s description of democracy is based on fundamental and universally accepted principles, including: participation, accountability, transparency, rule of law, separation of powers, access, subsidiarity, equality and freedom of the press.

- Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan: “Democracy is not just about one day every four or five years when elections are held, but a system of government that respects the separation of powers, fundamental freedoms like the freedom of thought, religion, expression, association and assembly and the rule of law... Any regime that rides roughshod on these principles loses its democratic legitimacy, regardless of whether it initially won an election.”

- Amartya Sen: “We must not identify democracy with majority rule. Democracy has complex demands, which certainly include voting and respect for election results, but it also requires the protection of liberties and freedoms, respect for legal entitlements, and the guaranteeing of free discussion and uncensored distribution of news and fair comment... Democracy is a demanding system, and not just a mechanical condition (like majority rule) taken in isolation.”

- African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance: The consolidation of democracy is achieved with the promotion of democratic institutions, elections, participatory democracy, and through cooperation and exchange of experiences between the States Parties at regional and continental levels.

- Samuel Huntington: “Democracy is based on the level or extent of: open, free and fair elections; limitations on political power; institutionalisation and stability; and electoral competition and widespread voting participation.”

“Democracy is not just about one day every four or five years when elections are held, but a system of government that respects the separation of powers, fundamental freedoms like the freedom of thought, religion, expression, association and assembly and the rule of law... Any regime that rides roughshod on these principles loses its democratic legitimacy, regardless of whether it initially won an election.”

Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

2006-2016: 109 elections, 44 changes of power

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Country Name</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Kenya, Cabo Verde, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Angola, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Angola, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Benin, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, DR Congo, Djibouti, DR Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Benin, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, DR Congo, Djibouti, DR Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Angola, Egypt, Ghana, Mauritius, Senegal, Sierra Leone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Benin, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, DR Congo, Djibouti, DR Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Benin, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, CAR, Chad, DR Congo, Djibouti, DR Congo, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>Benin, Cabo Verde, CAR, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Benin, Cabo Verde, CAR, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Benin, Cabo Verde, CAR, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, DR Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tunisia, Zambia, Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- In the past decade 96 direct and 13 indirect presidential elections took place in Africa resulting in 44 changes of power.
- 2011 and 2016 saw the most presidential elections (15) in the past decade.
- In 2016, eight elections led to a change of power.
- Zambia has had the most presidential elections (five) in the past decade.
- Two countries have not held any election since 2006: Eritrea and Libya.

The timeline portrays all direct elections that resulted in the election or nomination of the Head of State during the last decade. This includes executive elections, but also legislative elections where the Head of State is subsequently elected or nominated (Angola, Botswana, Ethiopia, Mauritius and South Africa).

Elections where the citizens did not directly vote have not been included.
## PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

### Leaving office: 44 elections, 13 violent oustings, 9 deaths

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The year represented is the year when the mandate started, not the year the election took place. Interim and Acting Heads of State have not been included. The leaders represented on the following countries are the Prime-Ministers: Ethiopia, Lesotho, Mauritius, Morocco, Somalia and Swaziland.
<table>
<thead>
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<td>Scheduled elections</td>
<td>Ismail Omar Guelleh</td>
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<td>Pakalitha Mosisili</td>
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<td>Hery Rajaonarimampianina</td>
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<td>Anerood Jugnauth</td>
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<td>Sabrina-Maria de Melo Santiago</td>
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<td>Scheduled elections</td>
<td>E. Lungu</td>
<td>Scheduled elections</td>
<td>E. Lungu</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Name* President/Prime Minister re-elected *Name* New President/Prime Minister *Name* Victory of an opposition/independent candidate *Name* Died in office *Name* Transitional/temporary/contested government *Name* Upcoming elections *Name* Violent ousting (coup, arrest, assassination)
Over the past decade, almost 70% of Africa’s population (32 countries) has gone through a direct or indirect presidential election that has led to a change of Head of State.

56 Heads of State have left office in total, with nine dead in office and 13 stepped down following a coup, arrest or uprising.

Through elections, leaders of 17 countries have remained the same over the past decade: Algeria, Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, DRC, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Liberia, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe. With the exception of Liberia 16 of the leaders took office before 2006. Two of the leaders, Gambia and Seychelles, are no longer in power.

However, in 2016, for more than a quarter of Africa’s population the leader has still not changed for the last ten years, and often much more.

### Longstanding African leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Took office</th>
<th>Still in office</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>37 years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>74 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>José Eduardo dos Santos</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teodoro Obiang</td>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>37 years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>74 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Biya</td>
<td>Cameroon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>34 years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yoweri Museveni</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>30 years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert Mugabe</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>29 years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idriss Deby</td>
<td>Chad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>26 years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omar Al-Bashir</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>23 years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>72 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaias Afwerki</td>
<td>Eritrea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>23 years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>70 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denis Sassou Nguesso</td>
<td>Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>19 years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>73 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paul Kagame</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>17 years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>79 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abdelaziz Bouteflika</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>17 years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>69 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ismail Omar Guelleh</td>
<td>Djibouti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>16 years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Kabila</td>
<td>DRC</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>15 years in power</td>
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<td>45 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pierre Nkurunziza</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11 years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>53 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faure Gnassingbe</td>
<td>Togo</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>11 years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>50 years old</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>10 years in power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>78 years old</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to Afrobarometer, in 34 African countries, about three-quarters of citizens are in favour of limiting presidential mandates to two terms. This proves to be true among the more educated citizens and the ones with greater exposure to news outlets.

According to Afrobarometer, in countries with no term limits, there is a higher desire to put them in place, such as Uganda, Togo, Cameroon and Zimbabwe.

Over the past decade, African countries have seen a mixed picture of presidential term limits and constitutional changes.

In ten countries, Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Djibouti, Gabon, Gambia, Mauritius, South Sudan, Togo and Uganda, the presidents are not subject to constitutional term limits.

In six countries: Algeria, Djibouti, Mauritania, Senegal, Seychelles and Zimbabwe a change of constitution has led to limiting term, age, or both over the last decade.

### "President for life": constitutional changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Term limit</th>
<th>Term duration</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td>Abolished the two-term limit</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
<td>Established the two-term limit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>2008</td>
<td>Abolished the two-term limit</td>
<td>Abolished the two-term limit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Congo</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Abolished the 70 years old age restriction</td>
<td>Abolished the two-term limit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Abolished the 75 years old age restriction</td>
<td>Established the two-term limit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Established the age restriction between 40 and 75 years old</td>
<td>Abolished the two-term limit</td>
<td>Reduced terms from six to five years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Equatorial Guinea</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Abolished the 75 years old age restriction</td>
<td>Established the two-term limit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Lowered the minimum age for presidential candidates from 40 to 35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Established the two five-year term</td>
<td>Abolished the two five-year term limit</td>
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<td>Niger</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Abolished the two five-year term limit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Shortened terms from seven to five years*</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Established the age restriction of presidential candidates to 75</td>
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<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>2016</td>
<td>Established the two five-year terms</td>
<td>Abolished the two-term limit</td>
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<td>2013</td>
<td>Established the two-term limit</td>
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</table>
The generation gap

The age gap between the population & their Head of State

- In 2016, the average median age of the African population is about 20 years old while the average age of the Heads of State is 66 years.
- Mauritius is the country with the smallest age difference between the median age of the population and the President (22 years), and Zimbabwe the country with the largest age difference (73 years).

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<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### No term limits: widening age gaps

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>83</td>
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<td>Congo</td>
<td>Denis Sassou-Nguesso</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>19</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Yoweri Museveni</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>81</td>
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<td>Djibouti</td>
<td>Ismail Omar Guelleh</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>24</td>
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<td>South Sudan</td>
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<td>65</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>74</td>
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<td>Chad</td>
<td>Idriss Deby</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>16</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>Ali Bongo Ondimba</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>Ameenah Curib-Fakim</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>35</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>Adama Barrow</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>60</td>
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<td>Togo</td>
<td>Faure Gnassingbe</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Presidents subject to constitutional age limits*  

- Despite not having term limits, President Yoweri Museveni, President Ismail Omar Guelleh and President Adama Barrow are subject to constitutional age limits. In Uganda and Djibouti, the maximum age for the president is 75 and in Gambia it is 65.

Constitute Project, State House of Uganda; WIPO
African initiatives for youth political empowerment

- Aimed at addressing the under-representation of the youth in the political arena, commissions for civic education, youth quotas and agendas on youth political participation have been adopted by several African countries.
- The African Youth Charter (AYC) provides a strategic framework for African States to empower and enhance the youth’s role in society and politics at continental, regional and national levels. The AYC was endorsed by the African Union Heads of States and Governments in 2006, entering into force in 2009 as part of the African Youth Decade Plan of Action 2009-2018.
- The AYC has been signed by 42 member states of the African Union and ratified by 38. This represents 89.0% and 76.8% respectively of the total African population.
- The 15 member states of the African Union that had not ratified as of June 2016 are: Algeria, Botswana, Burundi, CAR, Comoros, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, São Tomé & Príncipe and Sudan.

Selected initiatives

In Tunisia, political parties are required to put forward at least one candidate of 35 years old or younger, risking the loss of the right to one half of their public campaign financing if they fail to do so. Hence, 28 MPs are 35 years old or younger.

In Morocco, in the Lower House of Parliament, 30 seats are reserved for candidates under 40 years old.

In Ghana, the National Commission for Civic Education (NCCE) trains “youth aspirants” on the roles and responsibilities of elected members of parliament ahead of the elections.

The Independent Electoral Commission of Nigeria (INEC) partnered with the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) to support the recruitment of voter registration and polling station workers. With the introduction of biometric voter registration in 2010, NYSC members, under the age of 30, facilitated the transition to the use of new technologies. The INEC now trains and deploys young people enrolled in the NYSC programme for its election day operations.

The eligibility age for parliamentary elections dropped from 30 to 25 in 2011 in Egypt.

In Kenya’s National Assembly, 12 seats are reserved for representatives to be nominated by political parties to represent special interests, including youth, persons with disabilities and workers. The Senate has also elected two youth representatives.

In Uganda, five seats in Parliament are reserved for youth representatives. In 2015, 25 MPs were elected to represent special interest groups, including the youth.

The Rwandan constitution reserves two seats in the lower house for citizens under 35, to be chosen by an electoral college including members of the National Youth Council.

Prior to the 2014 national elections, the ‘IXSA’ (‘I Vote South Africa’) campaign was launched to encourage youth registration, participation, and engagement to make politics more accessible to the youth.
VOTER DISENCHANTMENT

Youth: the next majority

Percentage of citizens under the legal voting age in Africa, 2015

- These will become the bulk of voters in the next ten years.
- The legal voting age for all African countries is 18, except in Cameroon where it is 20.
- On average, 46.2% of African citizens are currently still below the legal voting age.
- In 16 countries, accounting for 47.3% of Africa’s population, more than half of the population is still below the legal voting age: Niger, Uganda, Chad, Angola, Mali, Cameroon, Gambia, Zambia, DRC, Burkina Faso, Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, Burundi, Nigeria, Senegal.
- In four countries, the legal military enlistment age is below the legal voting age.

Youth political engagement is decreasing

% 15-29 year-olds in Africa

- Over the past decade, youth political engagement has decreased in Africa in terms of political interest, election participation and civic engagement.
Registered voters: progress to be made

- In all but one country the legal voting age in national elections is 18, except for Cameroon (20) and Somalia which has no information.
- Of the 51 African countries that have information, voter registration is compulsory in only 23 countries accounting for 37.4% of the continent’s population.
- It is compulsory to vote in presidential and parliamentary elections in only three countries (DRC, Egypt, Gabon), accounting for 14.4% of the continent’s population.
- Tunisia, accounting for 1.0% of the continent’s population, is the only country that uses the national citizen register as a registration method for national elections.
- Chad, Ghana, Namibia, São Tomé & Príncipe, Seychelles and Zimbabwe, accounting for 5.0% of Africa’s population, have more registered voters than the size of the voting population.
- Registered voters account for less than two thirds of the voting population in Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Kenya, Sudan and Tunisia. These countries account for 18.2% of Africa’s population.
• Over 32.5 million Africans live outside their home country in 2015, accounting for 2.7% of Africa’s total population.

• Eleven out of 50 countries, accounting for 14.5% of Africans in the diaspora in 2015, do not allow citizens to vote outside of their countries: Congo, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Liberia, Madagascar, Nigeria, Seychelles, Tanzania, Togo and Uganda.

• Four African countries (Angola, Lesotho, Mauritius and Zimbabwe) allow citizens to vote outside of the country but apply strict conditions.

• Amongst the 11 countries that do not allow any of their citizens to vote outside of their home country:
  • The Liberian diaspora account for 6.1% of the country’s total population and one third of the country’s wealth.
  • The Togolese diaspora account for 6.1% of the country’s total population and one tenth of the country’s wealth.
  • The Gambian diaspora account for 4.5% of the country’s total population and one fifth of the country’s wealth.
VOTER DISENCHANTMENT

Voter turnout: a weakening trend

- Over the past decade, Rwanda had the highest voter turnout (97.5%) in its presidential election in 2010.
- Over the past decade, Cabo Verde had the lowest voter turnout (35.5%) in its presidential election in 2014.
- Voter turnout for presidential elections has declined following the Arab Spring in more than half of African countries (20 out of 38) that had two or more presidential elections in the past decade, including North African countries (Algeria, Egypt, Mauritania and Tunisia).
- Compared to the earliest election year in the last decade, Tunisian, Côte d’Ivoire, Algeria and Sudan’s voter turnout has declined by more than a quarter.
- The average African turnout has declined slightly from 64.9% (between 2006-2010) to 62.8% (between 2011-2016).
Election monitoring: taking ownership

- A growing ownership of elections has been seen in Africa over the past decade as the African Union and other regional bodies increased their election monitoring activities.
- Over the past decade, the African Union monitored more than 100 elections (both presidential and parliamentary) in Africa.
- In the most recent years (2011-2016), election monitoring missions by the African Union, and some Regional Economic Communities, particularly ECOWAS has more than tripled while the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa and SADC have have more than doubled.
- According to Afrobarometer surveys, the citizens of 36 African countries share a positive view of the quality of their elections, as 65% regarded their latest election as “completely free and fair” or “free and fair, but with minor problems”.
- However, a lot more of the respondents are aware of the existence of electoral commissions in 2014/2015 compared to ten years ago.

Election Monitoring Agencies in the IIAG

- For the first time, the 2016 IIAG includes measures on election monitoring agencies, captured in a new clustered indicator Election Monitoring Agencies from Global Integrity. Derived from qualitative assessments, the indicator assesses whether agencies mandate to organise and monitor national elections; their protection from political interference and whether they make public reports available before and after a national election.
- The continental average score for this indicator is 41.9 in 2015, making it the second lowest scoring measure in the Participation sub-category.

Trust in electoral commissions

- Kenya is the best performing country, receiving 87.5 points, while on the other end of the spectrum, seven countries (Angola, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Gambia, Somalia and Swaziland), accounting for 4.2% of the continental population, score 0.0.
- ECOWAS is the highest scoring REC (52.5 points), the majority (12 out of 15) member countries receiving a score higher than the continental average. Meanwhile, ECCAS is the lowest scoring REC (26.3 points), the majority (seven out of 10) member countries scoring below the African average.

African average scores & trends

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2016 IIAG INDICATORS</th>
<th>TREND 2006-2015</th>
<th>2015 SCORE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>+5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Digital &amp; IT Infrastructure</td>
<td>+15.7</td>
<td>+14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Rights Conventions</td>
<td>+11.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Child Mortality</td>
<td>+9.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workplace Gender Equality</td>
<td>+8.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural Support System</td>
<td>+9.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Land &amp; Water</td>
<td>+9.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary School Enrolment</td>
<td>+9.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laws on Violence against Women</td>
<td>+9.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cross-border Tensions</td>
<td>+8.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement with Rural Organisations</td>
<td>+8.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary School Completion</td>
<td>+8.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police Services</td>
<td>+8.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election Monitoring Agencies</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undernourishment</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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Regional Economic Community (REC)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regional Economic Community (REC)</th>
<th>Score/100.0</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>52.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEN-SAD</td>
<td>45.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African average</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA</td>
<td>40.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMU</td>
<td>37.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD</td>
<td>26.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECCAS</td>
<td>26.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Election-related violence: on the rise

- In the past ten years, even though many of the elections were considered “free and fair” some have not been free of violence before, during or after the election.
- During the election day, several presidential elections in the past decade involved violent incidents.
- In Africa, on average, from 2011 onwards, there was a spike of election-related violence one day before and on election day.

Election-related violence consists of violent events occurring before, during or after elections. Two measures from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) are used to calculate election-related violence: riots/protests and violence against civilians. Direct presidential elections (including multiple rounds where relevant) were analysed.

- Election-related violence on the election day has increased from 13.9% to 45.3% from 2006-2010 to 2011-2016, on average.
- Violence may be triggered due to discontent with the government, but also as a response to limited forms of democratic participation.

ACLED; NDI; Psephos Adam Carr Election Archive

Growing violence during election day

- 2013 and 2014 are the years where most of the elections encountered election-related violence during the election day.
- In 2013, only the first round of the Malian presidential election did not include election-related violence during the election day.
- In 2016, a reduction in election-related violence can be observed with only three elections out of 13 - in Chad, Ghana and Uganda - resulting in violent incidents.

ACLED; NDI; Psephos Adam Carr Election Archive
• There was an increase in election-related violence during election day throughout the past decade in every African region.

• Until 2010, North Africa and Central Africa did not register election-related violence during election day. Elections with violent incidents grew to 71.4% and 20.0% respectively from 2011 to 2016.

• The regions with the highest levels of election-related violence are East Africa, Southern Africa and North Africa, with 77.8%, 72.7% and 71.4% of the elections respectively resulting in violent incidents during election day.

• African citizens are protesting and rioting more. Over the last decade, the number of protests and riots have increased more than tenfold (+1120%).

• Over the last decade, the Social Unrest IIAG indicator has registered an important deterioration of -7.3 points. CAR is the country that has declined the most (-75.0), followed by Tunisia and Libya (-50.0).

• Protests and riots are generally becoming more violent, as fatalities increased by 407% from 2006 to 2015, with spikes in the number of fatalities in 2008, 2011 and 2013.

• In the past few years (2013-2015), the top motivations for public protest in Africa have been change of government, followed by poor economic conditions and public services, demands for wage increases and better working conditions.

• Protests and riots have also been used as a "democracy guarantor", either paving the way to the removal from office of long-standing autocrats (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya), or ensuring the respect of democracy (Burundi).
Current democracy: growing scepticism

According to Afrobarometer surveys, African citizens are becoming more sceptical about their democratic representatives. The trust and performance approval levels of Presidents, members of Parliaments and local councillors have declined over the last decade.

What % of African citizens trust their ...
What % of African citizens approve the performance of their ...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRESIDENTS?</th>
<th>MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT?</th>
<th>LOCAL COUNCILLORS?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005/06</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>10.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014/15</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>45.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \begin{align*}
66.7 & \downarrow -7.8 \\
58.9 & \downarrow -6.9 \\
44.2 & \downarrow -2.1 \\
\end{align*} \]

Afrobarometer (2)  
- Strongly disapprove/ Disapprove  
- Approve/ Strongly approve  
- Missing/ Refused/ Don’t know

Less than half of Africa’s population approve of their local councillors.
Civil society participation: a mixed picture

CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society, as defined by V-Dem, is voluntary and autonomous from the government and involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the State and hold State officials accountable. Amongst others, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) include interest groups, labour unions, social movements, professional associations and welfare organisations.

- In the 2016 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) a new indicator on Civil Society Participation was added with measures from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and the Africa Integrity Indicators.
- It assesses the extent to which the government enables the participation of civil society in the political process; allows NGOs to organise freely; and does not persecute or harass NGO employees.

IIAG Civil Society Participation, 2006-2015

- According to the IIAG results, the existence of a vibrant civil society is highly correlated with respect for citizens’ rights and democratic participation.

Correlations between Civil Society Participation &...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-category</th>
<th>Rights</th>
<th>Participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicator</td>
<td>Freedom of Expression</td>
<td>Freedom of Association &amp; Assembly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlation</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Since 2006, the indicator Civil Society Participation has registered a marginal improvement (+0.5), on average at the continental level.
- Nineteen out of 54 countries saw their levels of Civil Society Participation deteriorate in the last decade, including 11 by more than 10.0 points. This deterioration impacts almost half of the continent’s population (48.5%).
Freedoms of expression & association: some deteriorations

- The indicator Civil Society Participation is strongly correlated with both Freedom of Expression ($r=0.9$) and Media Freedom ($r=0.8$) in the 2016 IIAG.

- Over the last decade, Freedom of Expression in Africa has deteriorated by -2.7 points in the IIAG, Kenya being the country that has deteriorated the most (-16.5), followed by Madagascar (-14.9) and Burundi (-13.8).

- On average, only about half (51.0%) of citizens in Africa feel "completely free" to say what they think.

- Media Freedom scores have also deteriorated, on average, by -3.9 points over the past decade.

- The five worse performers in Civil Society Participation – Mali, Ethiopia, Niger, Angola, Gambia - have all registered deteriorations in the Media Freedom indicator over the past decade.

- Government interference in freedom of expression has become subtler, including laws on defamation and libel suits, security laws and uncensored but limited internet access.

Afrobarometer; Club de Madrid; MIF

- The indicator Civil Society Participation is also strongly correlated ($r=0.8$) with Freedom of Association & Assembly.

- Over the last decade, Freedom of Association & Assembly has deteriorated by -4.4 points on average at the continental level, with Comoros being the country that has deteriorated the most (-62.5), followed by Madagascar (-37.5) and Cameroon (-31.2).

- Eight countries register a worrying deterioration of more than 20.0 points in Freedom of Association & Assembly: Comoros, Madagascar, Cameroon, São Tomé & Príncipe, Burundi, Mauritius, Egypt and South Africa.

- On average, a little more than half (58.0%) of the citizens in Africa feel "completely free" to join any political organisation.

Afrobarometer; MIF
Social media freedom

- Over the last decade, the number of individuals using the Internet in Africa has increased by 784% from 2006 to 2015. It is estimated that over 120 million African citizens might be using Facebook every month.
- The rise of social media, especially on mobile devices, allows people to bypass traditional media and speak to large numbers without a journalist intermediary. People’s voices can reach broader audiences and are harder to censor or counter.
- Social media has paved the way for important democratic changes by allowing citizens to find shared grievances, opportunities for action and to organise movements. During the Arab Spring, protests in Tunisia and Egypt were mainly organised via Facebook and Twitter.
- As a direct consequence, a decline in Internet freedom has been registered. At the continental level, the Ibrahim Index of African Governance registers a deterioration (-3.4) in Online Censorship in the past decade with 17 (out of 53) countries registering a decline. Kenya has registered the largest decline (-75.0 out of 100.0).
- The most censored Internet topics are “criticism of authorities”, “corruption”, “conflict” and “political opposition”.

Government barriers to Civil Society Organisations

BARRIERS TO REGISTRATION

- The governments of Burundi, Ethiopia and South Sudan achieve monopolistic control over entry and exit of CSOs into public life and the governments of Algeria, Eritrea, Rwanda and Sudan exercise substantial control.

RESTRICTIONS ON INTERNATIONAL FUNDING

- Ethiopia restricts the foreign funding of any group working on human rights or governance to 10% of its revenue.
- Angola bans funding from foreign entities that are not approved by a government body.

EXCLUSION FROM POLICY-MAKING

- In 2015, important CSOs were recognised as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voices on such issues in only four countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Tunisia.

VAGUE REGULATION POWERS

- In Tanzania, an international NGO must “refrain from doing any act which is likely to cause misunderstanding”.
- Uganda’s 2015 NGO Bill prohibits “any act, which is prejudicial to the interests of Uganda and the dignity of the people of Uganda”.

RESTRICTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS

- Uganda’s Public Order Management Bill 2011 includes a requirement to inform the police at least seven days in advance of any public meetings of three or more persons.
- Most recently, in mid-January 2017, following anti-government protests and strikes against the discrimination of Anglophones by the French-speaking majority, the Cameroon government shut the Internet down in English-speaking areas of the country.

Govt. of Uganda; Oxfam; Roth, K; V-Dem (2); VOA
THE NEXT GENERATION OF DEMOCRACY

Direct democracy: alternative tools

- Direct democracy allows citizens to decide about specific laws without delegating the decision-making process solely to their elected representatives. It complements representative democracy, where citizens choose which candidates and parties they want to elect and empower them to make decisions on their behalf.

Direct democracy mechanisms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mechanism</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Legally available in # African countries (/50)</th>
<th>Population in Africa with access to direct democracy mechanisms (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mandatory Referendum</td>
<td>Direct vote on a specific, political, constitutional or legislative issue. The result is legally binding.</td>
<td>35 countries</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optional Referendum</td>
<td>Direct vote on a specific, political, constitutional or legislative issue. The result is not legally binding.</td>
<td>35 countries</td>
<td>58.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens’ Initiatives</td>
<td>Vote on a political, constitutional or legislative measure proposed by several citizens, who must gather a minimum of signatures in support of it.</td>
<td>6 countries</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agenda Initiatives</td>
<td>Citizens can place an issue on the agenda of a parliament or legislative assembly by gathering enough signatures in support of it.</td>
<td>7 countries</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recall</td>
<td>Vote on ending the term of office of an elected official if enough signatures in support of a recall vote are collected.</td>
<td>5 countries</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- In Africa, more than half of the countries have legal provisions for Mandatory and Optional Referendums, accounting for 79.0% and 58.2% of the population respectively. Similarly, in Europe, out of the 39 countries assessed, more than half have these mechanisms in place.
- However, only a small minority of African countries ensures access to other direct democracy mechanisms such as Citizens’ Initiatives, Agenda Initiatives and Recall. In Europe, almost half of the countries assessed do so.
- Only three European countries (Belarus, Liechtenstein, Slovakia) have legal provisions for Recall, accounting for 2.0% of the population. In Africa, five countries, accounting for 31.6% of citizens have provisions for Recall.

PROS

- In the context of increasing voter apathy and disenchantment, and declining voter turnout, direct democracy can help to re-engage citizens in the democratic political process.
- Citizens can monitor and check the government throughout its terms, strengthening political transparency and legitimacy.
- Direct democracy can be used to resolve major political questions, where a decision taken by the people will more likely be accepted as legitimate.

CONS

- Direct democracy demands from citizens a relatively high level of knowledge of issues that are sometimes complex.
- Direct democracy may threaten the civil rights of vulnerable minorities or exacerbate racial or ethnic tensions in some societies.
- Referendums have also been employed by authoritarian regimes to create a veneer of democratic legitimacy.
Participatory democracy: influencing public spending

- Participatory democracy is a democratic procedure that seeks decision-making and consultation from direct citizen participation. It can consist of a variety of mechanisms such as participatory budgeting, neighbourhood councils and consultative referendums.

- Data on participatory governance, derived from the Africa Integrity Indicators (AII), assessing the extent to which citizens can provide input into budget decisions, and the Open Budget Survey (OBS), assessing whether governments create the conditions that allow for direct engagement during the formal budget process, show varying results.

- In Ghana, Mauritius, Rwanda and Zambia citizens can fully participate in budget debates (100.0).

- The highest levels of public participation in budget process are reached in South Africa, Malawi, Zambia, Kenya, Ghana and Cameroon.

Budgetary participation: Kenya

The constitution and statutory laws establish participation mechanisms that offer citizens opportunities, during both budget formulation and approval, to influence policies and priorities.

The public can participate in the development of the Pre-Budget Statement, called the Budget Policy Statement. The Finance Ministry organises public hearings where citizens can input on the content of the Budget Policy Statement before it is presented to the legislature. The Institute of Economic Affairs undertakes public consultations across the country and prepares a Citizen’s Alternative Budget which is presented at the public hearings.

When the legislature’s Budget and Appropriations Committee considers the Executive’s Budget Proposal, there is a two-month period where citizens can submit memoranda, email or presentations to influence the content of the budget.

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E-democracy: transparency & efficiency

- E-Democracy refers to the processes and structures that encompass all forms of electronic communication (through internet, mobile and other technologies) between government and the citizen.

- The UN E-Participation Index, a component of the UN E-Government Survey, measures the capacity and willingness of the state in promoting deliberate, participatory decision-making in public. It sets a framework for the provision of information by the government to citizens through three indicators:

  - **E-information**
    Enabling participation by providing citizens with public information and access to information without and upon demand.

  - **E-consultation**
    Engaging citizens in contributions to and deliberation on public policies and services.

  - **E-decision-making**
    Empowering citizens through co-design of policy option and co-production of service components and delivery modalities.

- By allowing faster, less costly and wider communication, the use of information and communication technologies (ICT) enhances the direct involvement and participation of citizens, increases the transparency of the political process, and improves the quality of opinion formation by opening new spaces of information and deliberation.

- Applications of e-Participation in remote areas could help citizens connect with their local and national governments.

- Africa is the region in the world with lowest e-Participation levels.

- In Africa, Morocco has the highest e-Participation levels, followed by Tunisia and Mauritania. In contrast, Chad and Djibouti are the countries where e-Participation is most limited.

- E-Democracy presents technological and social challenges, amongst which is the “digital divide”. E-Democracy initiatives may alienate those who lack physical access to ICT or the skills to use them. In East Africa, ICT tools for governance are most effective in cases where low-cost and non-Internet based methods and tools such as radio and mobile phones are used.

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E-voting: Namibia

Electronic voting (e-voting) refers to the use of electronic systems to cast and count votes and can increase the security of the ballot, speed up the processing of results, make voting easier and reduce fraud.

Namibia was the first African country to use e-voting in a national election. During the 2014 general election, the Electoral Commission of Namibia deployed 2,080 sets of e-voting machines at fixed and temporary polling stations.

E-voting was largely successful in Namibia and its adoption by other Southern Africa countries, and permanent adoption in Namibia, was recommended.

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2016 UN E-Participation Index, country scores

Score/1, higher is better

2016 UN E-Participation Index, continental average scores

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Open data on the continent: National Statistics Offices

Budget monitoring: Nigeria

BudgIT is a platform that uses data-mining tools to help citizens understand how the government is spending their money. The project uses infographics that describe patterns and trends in Nigerian public spending, conducts data journalism and engages the public using other communication tools. It also allows citizens to help monitor public initiatives by posting information and pictures, and demanding government action with regard to unsolved problems. BudgIT is a private initiative that has reached over 750,000 Nigerians, and has been replicated in Ghana and Sierra Leone. A similar initiative in Uganda has been promoted by the central government, although it is not as successful as Nigeria’s.

- Open data – free, available to all, accessible, licensed for use and reuse and well-documented – enables e-Democracy. Citizens that are accurately informed not only perceive greater governmental transparency and accountability, but also can actively use the data and participate.
- In Africa, although 46 countries have an official National Statistics Office (NSO) website available, only 20 provide data in a machine-readable format. Many countries publish data only in PDF files or as images from print publications. Only 19 countries actively outreach via newsletter or social media engagement.
- Even though data may be available online from NSO websites, it may often be out of date. In 2014, one quarter of African NSO websites had not been updated for over a year.
Prior to the colonial demarcation of the continent, several African countries, traditional chiefs and political systems were well-known for their “highly participatory nature”, in which community gatherings offered a wide platform for citizens to express their concerns and take part in the decision-making process. The terms used for these community gatherings varied across the continent:

- **PITSO** (Lesotho)
- **SHIR** (Somalia)
- **KGOTLA** (Botswana)
- **BARAZA** (Kenya)

In 2015, African citizens trust their traditional leaders more than their Presidents, members of Parliament or local councillors. Also, the performance approval levels for traditional leadership are higher than for democratic representatives.

According to Afrobarometer surveys, in 2009 45.1% of African citizens believed that traditional leaders had “some” or “a great deal” of influence in governing the local community.

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African nations, chieftainship is recognised in Botswana. Kgota practices are also recognised in the constitution of Botswana.

In Mozambique, the government tried to foster a stronger civic participation in local government through traditional chiefs, while “limiting their influence over local government”. A decree reinforced that local state bodies should indeed interact with traditional leaders and secretaries of suburban neighbourhoods.

### Traditional methods of mediation & conflict resolution: Rwanda, Tanzania & Sierra Leone

In 2006, Rwanda launched an innovative system known as the *imihigo* process, aimed at holding mayors accountable for service delivery. The government adapted the system by incorporating “specific measures for planning, monitoring, evaluation and accountability”. In this way, central government can coordinate with local projects, and strategies and targets at both levels are aligned. By 2010, government officials believed that the imihigo process had resulted in improved service delivery in the districts.

Established in 1985, Ward tribunals in Tanzania are judicial organs made up of members who are elected by a ward committee, each of which is led by a chairman appointed by the local ward development council (WDC). Ward tribunals are an evolution of the colonial customary courts, and today supplement the local judiciary by providing mediation services, thus easing its workload. Their mediation and arbitration functions extend to disputes that arise at village level, such as reconciliation within marriages or disputes over child-maintenance settlements, land or water.

In 2011, Sierra Leone adopted a national chieftain governance and traditional administration policy to provide a framework for good governance and minimise conflicts over financial resources between councils and chiefdoms.

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**Traditional leadership: Botswana & Mozambique**

Botswana’s democracy is strongly tied to the traditional Tswana kgotla system, which creates a public forum where citizens can voice their opinion and reach a common consensus on several issues. This forum is headed by a village chief, as unlike for many

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Afrobarometer (2008), THP
Cities’ populations: bigger than countries’

- More than half of Africa’s population will live in urban areas by 2037.
- The 20 most populous cities in Africa manage city populations equivalent to many country populations.
- Cairo, Africa’s most populous city, manages a population that is larger than each of the 36 least populous countries on the continent in 2015.
- Population projections estimate that Cairo’s population will be larger than the collected 33 least populous countries in Africa in 2025.
- Several African cities will see economic expansion over the next decade and a half, some seeing 250% to 350% GDP growth.

Population: cities vs. countries (millions of people)

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Population & GDP growth, 2014-2030

% change in city GDP at 2012 US$
Local democracy status

- Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) assessed the scope of local governments in 22 African countries in 2015, all of whom have local governments.

- Twelve countries with data elect their local executive and local assembly. Within the countries assessed, 65% of the population can elect their local executive and local assembly.

- Four countries – Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan - do not hold elections at the local level. Within the countries assessed, 14.5% of the population cannot elect their local executive and local assembly.

- The method by which the municipal council and local executives come to power varies, ranging from nominations through to appointments.

- The United Cities and Local Governments Global Report (GOLD) assessed 20 countries, of which nine can democratically remove local executives from power.

- Mozambique, Benin, South Africa and Mauritania allow independent candidates in local elections.

- In Ghana, political parties are excluded from local elections entirely; the list is open only to independent candidates.

Portrait of local democracy in selected countries

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<td>5 years</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>3 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>Mixed (majority,</td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>proportional or</td>
<td>1 round</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mixed)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Proportional</td>
<td>6 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td></td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>Mixed (predominantly majority)</td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>5 years</td>
</tr>
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- No information available
Decentralisation: Liberia

Initiated in 2007, the Liberia Decentralization and Local Development (LDLD) program to support the decentralisation process and help governments access development funds is now succeeded by the Liberia Decentralization Support Program (LDSP), a five-year program of support with the same aims.

Accomplishments so far include citizens having access to documentation services at the county level i.e. birth and marriage certificates, with 70% of women receiving birth certificates. Further, as a result of the registration of traditional marriages at the county level, women now have more rights in their marriages.
In 1972, Tanzania abolished local government to emphasise a unitary state, and centralised planning. At the end of his administration President Nyerere said: “There are certain things I would not do if I were to start again. One of them is the abolition of local governments.”

Structures

DECONCENTRATION

The transfer of administrative responsibilities or functions to subordinate units of government, often based on geography. Relocation of execution to the local level with decision-making power remaining at the centre.

DEVOLUTION

A more far-reaching form of decentralisation, involving the transfer of governance powers and responsibilities to sub-national levels that are largely outside the direct control of the central government. Often a process which makes local governments directly accountable to local people.

DECENTRALISATION

Institutional decentralisation: the creation or development of administrative bodies, systems and mechanisms, at local or intergovernmental level, to manage and support the decentralisation process, including links between formal government bodies and other key local actors such as traditional authorities, nongovernmental organisations or private sector agents.

Political decentralisation: entails a degree of accountability to local people, though, for example, an electoral process.

Fiscal decentralisation: the transfer of powers to raise (tax) and retain (spend) financial resources to fulfil.

Finances: the lack of autonomy

- Local authorities in Africa lack financial independence and most major financial decisions must be funnelled through central governments:
  - Excluding South Africa, only a handful of African countries allow sub-national authorities to control 5% or more of the national budget.
  - Revenue collection is mainly centralised, leaving cities to wait on remittances from their national governments.
  - The timing and amount of remittances can vary depending on the current economic situation or politics.
  - In most countries, laws or constitutional frameworks bar cities from incurring long-term debt.

Citiscope; DIA; Eckert, A.

Yulani, E.L.
African countries are often linguistically, ethnically and religiously divided. In no African country is the whole population of only one or even two religions.

Constitutions have been used across the continent as the basis for ensuring inclusivity and diversity management. The main challenge, however, is not the normative frameworks, but the institutional and political arrangements that enable major societal divisions to be moderated and reconciled in practice.

**Constitutional provisions on diversity in selected countries**

**GHANA**

Constitution states that “the state shall actively promote the integration of the peoples of Ghana and prohibit discrimination and prejudice on the grounds of place of origin, circumstances of birth, ethnic origin, gender or religion, creed or other beliefs.”

**KENYA**

Constitution specifies that political parties should have a “national character”.

**RWANDA**

Banned the use of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa identities.

**NIGERIA**

Constitution specifically prohibits political parties with regional, ethnic or religious colouration. Names and party symbols must not reflect primordial identities, and parties should not base their electoral platforms on ethnic or sectarian agendas.

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**Proportional representation in selected countries**

- In **Burundi**, the system is based on ethnic quotas: the Hutus are allotted 60% of the seats, the Tutsis get 40% and the Twa receive three seats. Women should receive a minimum of 30% of the seats. In addition, six of the 100 seats in the parliament are reserved for ethnic balancing.

- In **Kenya** and **Nigeria**, a Commission for Diversity Management to champion groups’ concerns and to oversee implementation of the diversity-inclusion agenda was established.

- **Ethiopia, Nigeria** and **South Africa** designed political and constitutional measures to attempt to assuage fears and protect interests of ethnic minorities through arrangements like proportional representation and federalism.
There are 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 targets which 193 countries agreed to be implemented from 1 January 2016. The SDGs have been acknowledged governance as a fundamental element of long-term development. Each of the chapters are stamped with the relevant SDGs that are applicable to them.

**Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)**

1. **End poverty in all its forms everywhere.**
2. **End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture.**
3. **Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages.**
4. **Ensure inclusive and quality education for all and promote lifelong learning.**
5. **Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls.**
6. **Ensure access to water and sanitation for all.**
7. **Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all.**
8. **Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all.**
9. **Build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialisation and foster innovation.**
10. **Reduce inequality within and among countries.**
11. **Make cities inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable.**
12. **Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns.**
13. **Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.**
14. **Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources.**
15. **Sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, halt and reverse land degradation, halt biodiversity loss.**
16. **Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies.**
17. **Revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000s commodity super-cycle</td>
<td>Rise and fall of many commodity prices (e.g. oil, metals, chemicals…) which took place during the first two decades of the 2000s (2000-2014). One of the main causes of the commodity boom was the rising demand from emerging countries such as the BRICs, particularly China.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balassa Index</td>
<td>An index that can be used to measure the revealed competitive advantage of a country. It was developed by Bela Balassa and Marc Noland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brain-drain</td>
<td>Departure of educated or professional people from one country, economic sector or field for another. Most of the time, this is related to better salaries or living conditions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil registration</td>
<td>Process by which countries keep a continuous and complete record of births and deaths of their population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>Citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions and ideas, exchange information, achieve mutual goals, make demands on the State and hold State officials accountable. Civil society is voluntary and autonomous from the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clean energy</td>
<td>Energy, as electricity or nuclear power, that does not pollute the atmosphere when used, as opposed to coal and oil.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Climate finance</td>
<td>Flow of funds towards activities that reduce greenhouse gas emissions or help society adapt to the impact of climate change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decentralisation</td>
<td>Transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government to intermediate and local governments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Demos</td>
<td>Greek word meaning people or neighbourhood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Diaspora</td>
<td>Dispersion or spread of any people from their original homeland.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct democracy</td>
<td>Process that allows citizens to decide about specific laws without delegating the decision-making process solely to their elected representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct presidential elections</td>
<td>System of choosing political officeholders in which the voters directly cast ballots for the person, persons, or political party that they desire to see elected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-democracy</td>
<td>Processes and structures that encompass all forms of electronic communication (through the Internet, mobile and other technologies) between government and the citizen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Election monitoring</td>
<td>Observation of an election by one or more independent parties, typically from another country or a non-governmental organisation (NGO), primarily to assess the conduct of an election process on the basis of national legislation and international election standards.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E-voting</td>
<td>Use of electronic systems to cast and count votes, aimed at increasing the security of the ballot, speeding up the processing of results, making voting easier and reducing fraud.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product: the monetary value of all the finished goods and services that are produced in a given country within a specific time period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illicit Financial Flows</td>
<td>Money that is illegally earned, transferred or utilised. These funds typically originate from three sources: commercial tax evasion, trade misinvoicing and abusive transfer pricing; criminal activities, including the drug trade, human trafficking, illegal arms dealing, and smuggling of contraband; bribery and theft by corrupt government officials.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imihigo</td>
<td>Process that holds mayors accountable for service delivery in Rwanda.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect presidential elections</td>
<td>Process in which voters in an election do not choose between candidates for an office but rather elect persons who will choose the candidate for them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Informal and unregulated economies</td>
<td>Activities and income that are partially or fully outside government regulation, taxation or observation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kratia</td>
<td>Greek word meaning power, force.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leapfrog</td>
<td>To advance from one place, position, or situation to another without progressing through all or any of the places or stages in between.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Service Businesses (MSBs)</td>
<td>Legal term used by financial regulators to describe businesses that transmit or convert money. The definition was created to encompass more than just banks which normally provide these services, to include non-bank financial institutions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money Value Transfer Systems (MVTS)</td>
<td>Financial services that involve the acceptance of cash, cheques, other monetary instruments or other stores of value and the payment of a corresponding sum in cash or other form to a beneficiary by means of a communication, message, transfer, or through a clearing network to which the MVTS provider belongs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nominal GDP</td>
<td>Measurement of a country’s economic output that includes changes in prices due to inflation or deflation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participatory democracy</td>
<td>Democratic procedure that seeks decision-making and consultation from direct citizen participation. It can consist of a variety of mechanisms such as participatory budgeting, neighbourhood councils and consultative referendums.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photovoltaics</td>
<td>The conversion of light into electricity using semi-conducting materials that exhibit the photovoltaic effect, a phenomenon studied in physics, photochemistry, and electrochemistry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political disenfranchisement</td>
<td>Most commonly refers to the removal of the right to vote, which is also called the franchise or suffrage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs)</td>
<td>Individual who is or has been entrusted with a prominent public function, as defined by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population of concern</td>
<td>A term used by UNHCR to capture a wide set of people: refugees (including people in refugee-like situations and refugees returned to the country), asylum-seekers (including pending cases), internally displaced persons (including IDPs returned to the country), stateless persons and others of concern.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Populism</td>
<td>Political doctrine that proposes that the common people are exploited by a privileged elite and which seeks to resolve this.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential mandates</td>
<td>A mandate is the authority granted by a constituency to act as its representative. The concept of a government having a legitimate mandate to govern via the fair winning of a democratic election is a central idea of representative democracy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportional representation</td>
<td>Idea that seats in parliament should be allocated so that they are in proportion to the votes cast. Although there are many different types of PR, this is the base requirement for a system to be described as proportional.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real GDP</td>
<td>Measurement of a country’s economic output that takes into account the effects of inflation or deflation. Thus, it reports the gross domestic product as if prices never went up or down, providing a more realistic assessment of growth.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Registered voter</td>
<td>Person who has recorded his/her name in the voting register and is legally entitled to cast a vote.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittance sector</td>
<td>Transfers from migrants to resident households in their country of origin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural transformation</td>
<td>Transition of an economy from low productivity and labour-intensive economic activities to higher productivity and skill-intensive activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Term limits</td>
<td>Legal restriction that limits the number of terms an officeholder may serve in a particular elected office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tipping point</td>
<td>Critical point in a situation, process, or system beyond which a significant and often unstoppable effect or change takes place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total dependency ratio</td>
<td>Measure of the ratio of the dependent population (&lt;15 &amp; 65+) per 100 population aged 15-64.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total factor productivity</td>
<td>Measure of the efficiency of all inputs to a production process. Increases in total factor productivity usually result from technological innovations or improvements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter disenchantment</td>
<td>Voter dissatisfaction or disappointment with the current political situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voter turnout</td>
<td>Percentage of eligible voters who cast a ballot in an election.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth bulge</td>
<td>Demographic pattern where the proportion of persons aged 15-24 in the population increases very significantly compared to other age groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Youth unemployment</td>
<td>Percentage of the total labour force aged 15-24 that is unemployed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakat</td>
<td>Compulsory giving of a set proportion of one’s wealth to charity in Islam.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Acronyms

ACLED The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project
ACSR The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism
AEconomic Outlook
Al-Shabaab Movement of Striving Youth
AML Anti-money laundering
AMU The Arab Maghreb Union
ANC African National Congress party
APRM African Peer Review Mechanism
AQIM al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ATM Automated Teller Machine
AU African Union
AYC African Youth Charter
BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BCE Before Common Era
CBN The Central Bank of Nigeria
CEN-SAD Community of Sahel-Saharan States
CFR Council on Foreign Relations
COMESA The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
CSOs Civil Society Organisations
DIA Democracy in Africa
EAC East African Community
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
FATF Financial Action Task Force
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
FIS Islamic Salvation Front
FLM Macina Liberation Front
GCCS Global Center for Cooperative Security
GCTF Global Counter Terrorism Forum
GI Global Integrity
GIA Armed Islamic Group
GIMAS Organization of Moroccan Aeronautics Companies
GSPC Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat
GTD Global Terrorism Database
GTI Global Terrorism Index
IBP International Budget Partnership
ICAPAT IGAD Capacity Building Program Against Terrorism
ICU Islamic Courts Union
IDEA Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
IEP Institute for Economics and Peace
IFF Illicit Financial Flows
IIAG Ibrahim Index of African Governance
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
INEC Independent Electoral Commission
IOM International Organization for Migration
IS Islamic State
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIL-L ISIL-Libya
ISIL-SP ISIL-Sinai Province
ISS Institute for Security Studies
ISSP IGAD Security Sector Program
KFR Kidnap for ransom
LDLD Liberia Decentralization and Local Development
LDSP Liberia Decentralization Support Program
MIF Mo Ibrahim Foundation
MSBs Money Service Businesses
MVTS Money Value Transfer Systems
MUJAO Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
NCCE National Commission for Civic Education
NDI National Democratic Institute
NFIU Nigeria Financial Intelligence Unit
NGOs Non-governmental organisation
NPO Non-profit Organisations
NSO National Statistics Office
NYSC The National Youth Service Corps
OAU Organisation of African Unity
OBS Open Budget Survey
OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC Organization of Islamic Cooperation
PASDEP Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty
PEPs Politically Exposed Persons
REC Regional Economic Communities
SADC Southern African Development Community
SDPRP Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Programme
START The Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
STR Suspicious Transaction Report
TRAC Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium
UCLG The United Cities and Local Governments
UN United Nations
UNCCCT United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre
UNDESA The United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPAN United Nations Public Administration Network
USMA United States Military Academy
V-DEM Varieties of Democracy
WACD West Africa Commission on Drugs
WB World Bank
WDC Ward Development Council
WDI World Development Indicators
WFP World Food Programme
WPP World Population Prospects
The Mo Ibrahim Foundation’s Forum report makes use of the latest possible updates and data from a wide range of sources. A reference list containing all the sources that have been used for the creation of this document is provided at the end of the report. Many of the facts and figures have been reprocessed by the Mo Ibrahim Foundation. Data were correct at time of research. In some cases, the numbers may not add up to the total due to rounding.

Any data attributed to the years before 2011 are based on the former configuration of the African continent (53 states). Data that are attributed to the years 2011 or later represent the current configuration of Africa (54 states, including South Sudan).

All total population statistics are taken from the 2015 revision of the World Population Prospects from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) unless indicated otherwise. When referring to population projections, medium variant estimates, which constitute the most likely demographic developments, are used.

The definition of youth may vary according to source. While the chosen youth unemployment and youth population data reflect the UN definition of youth (individuals aged 15-24), Afrobarometer surveys classify youth as individuals aged 15-29.

The composition of regions may vary according to source (e.g. while IMF data include Mexico in North America, UNDESA data include Mexico in Latin America and the Caribbean).

Data for Morocco may or may not include Western Sahara depending on the source.

Dollars are US dollars unless indicated otherwise. For the purposes of consistency throughout the report, currency amounts that were not in US dollars when taken from source have been converted to US Dollars through www.xe.com, using the currency conversion rates available on 22.02.2017.

The number of general elections in different election counts throughout the report may vary depending on whether indirect and run-off elections are accounted for.

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For any research related enquiries about this report, please contact the Foundation’s Research Team: research@moibrahimfoundation.org

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</tbody>
</table>

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UNTAPPED LOCAL DEMOCRACY
Cities’ populations: bigger than countries

Local democracy status

The path to local autonomy: structures & resources

SPOTLIGHT - AFRICA’S DIVERSITY: AN ASSET FOR DEMOCRACY?
In 2014 the annual turnover of Al-Shabaab was estimated at $70 million, making it the eighth “richest” terrorist organisation in the world, while Boko Haram, with $25 million, was the tenth.

Some 55,000 migrants are estimated to be smuggled annually from Africa into Europe, generating revenue of around $150 million.

70% of the continent’s population has seen its Head of State change over the last decade.

In 2016, in 16 countries the President has been in power between ten and 37 years. Their ages vary from 45 to 93.

On average, more than half (58%) of the citizens in Africa feel “completely free” to join any political organisation.

Ethiopia restricts the foreign funding of any group working on human rights or governance to 10% of its revenue.

With the end of the commodity boom, Africa’s annual GDP growth decreased from 6.4% in 2012 to 2.1% in 2016. Africa’s annual GDP growth is projected to recover and reach 4.5% by 2021.

Tertiary-educated Africans have the highest migration rates.

Nine countries - Algeria, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Madagascar, Mauritania, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles and Zimbabwe - have changed their constitution over the last decade to limit presidential terms.

South Africa is not able to provide jobs for more than half of its youth population.

Agriculture-focused economies have achieved high economic growth with low youth unemployment.

Africa is expected to warm around 1.5 times faster than the global average.

More than 25% of Africa’s population lives within 100km of the coastal zone, threatened by rising sea levels.